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I. THE FIXTURES OF UNITED STATES' LEGAL FEDERALISM
Several of the essays in this symposium, Constructing a New Federalism:
Jurisdictional Competition and Competence,' illustrate the current framework
in which debates within the United States about federalism-be it legislative,
judicial, or executive-proceed. The task at hand is to consider (from a rich
range of perspectives) whether a particular arena about which laws are made
(be it torts,2 the environment, or welfare4) belongs either to state or to
t Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center; Visiting
Professor, New York University School of Law. This commentary relates to and continues themes
discussed in Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective
Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171 (1995); Rereading "The Federal Courts":
Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1021 (1994); and Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
Cm. L. REV. 671 (1989). I appreciate the help of Denny Curtis, Richard Bieder, and Elizabeth
Cabraser, and of USC law students Kavita Amar, Amy Melner, Kelley Poleynard, and Linda Thomas.
1. Co-Sponsored by the Yale Law and Policy Review and the Yale Journal on Regulation, held in
New Haven, Connecticut on March 1-2, 1996.
2. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: What Happened to Devolution?, in
YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTINGA NEW
FEDERALISM 429 (1996); James F. Blurnstein, A Perspective on Federalism and Medical Malpractice,
in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A
NEW FEDERALISM 411 (1996); Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two Assumptions about
Federalism and Tort Reform, in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION,
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federal governance, or when overlapping regulatory regimes and judicial
decision making are permissible. While the limits of either state or federal
powers are not fixed, and the doctrinal and policy arguments change somewhat,
the pervasive sense is that preexisting (albeit vague and contested) boundaries
and options exist; opportunities for invention are not generous.
Judges and law professors are central voices in defining the parameters of
federalism in the United States. Their discussion (which I term "legal
federalism"5) reinforces an understanding of the limited options available
under the current framework. Sometimes the answers are provided by efforts
to mine the meaning of particular constitutional provisions, such as the
Commerce Clause or other sections of Article I, or the parameters of Article
HI, or the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. For example, three times in the
last five years, the United States Supreme Court has struck down congressional
statutes for breaking federalism's barriers.6 The doctrinal frame has var-
ied-from Commerce Clause powers to the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments-but the analytic enterprise shares common ground: the questions asked
and answered by the majority opinions are about the scope of congressional
authority under its constitutionally-enumerated powers and about states'
SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 371 (1996); Gary T. Schwartz, Assessing the
Adequacy of State Products Liability Lawmaking, in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL
ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSrRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 359 (1996).
3. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Environmental Policy: The Forgotten Message of
Federalism, in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM:
CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 23 (1996); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in CompetitionAmong Jurisdictions in EnvironmentalLaw, in YALE
LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW
FEDERALISM 67 (1996); see also Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental
Externalities, 38 ARIz. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
4. See Jerry Mashaw & Dylan Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements and Federalism:A Conceptual
Map of Contested Terrain, in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEw/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION,
SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 297 (1996); R. Shep Melnick, Federalism and the
New Rights, in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM:
CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 325 (1996); Steven D. Sugannan, Welfare Reform and the
Cooperative Federalism of America's Public Income Transfer Programs, in YALE LAW AND POLICY
REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 123
(1996).
5. Others use the term "constitutional federalism." See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning
Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory Competition, in YALE LAW AND
POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM
149 (1996).
6. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626-34 (1995) (holding that Gun-Free School Zones
Act, which made possession of firearm within school zone a federal offense, exceeded Congress's
Commerce Clause powers); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123-33 (1996)
(finding aspects of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, which provided for state negotiations with
tribes relating to certain forms of gambling and authorizing suit for violations thereof, violative of
Eleventh Amendment); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-83 (1992) (striking in part Low
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 because provisions characterized as
"commandeering" states exceeded congressional authority and violated Tenth Amendment). See
generally Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995).
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prerogatives under the Tenth and Eleventh amendments.
When the focus shifts from constitutional to "policy" analyses,7 efforts are
made to develop criteria for when the federal government should act. For
example, in a recently issued report, The Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts, published by the Judicial Conference of the United States,' a
committee of federal judges described their presumptions against increasing the
civil and criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts and listed criteria by which
to assign matters to the federal and state courts. The judicial committee
categorized some interests as distinctively federal; further, it relied on the
concept of federal by default, that federalization is appropriate when state-based
enforcement mechanisms fail.9 Other commentators have also invoked the idea
of states' inabilities to perform a particular task well as licensing a federal
role. ' Sometimes such discussions have a more positive tone, framed in terms
of the "competency" of a particular unit of government to perform a given
function "efficiently;" consideration is given to whether something about the
nature of a specific issue is better served by polities of particular sizes and at
certain physical distances from either people or property.
Most of these discussions entail a search for some form of "principled"
bases for allocation of authority. In this symposium, on Constructing a New
Federalism, reasons for federal action include that state regulatory regimes may
do harm to out-of-staters, that states may compete with one another in a fashion
7. As Professor Scheiber points out, law and policy are often intermingled; "in our system,
questions of policy and politics are wrapped in constitutional garments so routinely that it is not quite
evident at times whether such wrappings are correctly described as 'disguise.'" Harry N. Scheiber,
Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition: The Devolution Proposals in
Perspective, in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM:
CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 227, 294 (1996). For discussion of the distinctions between
federalism claims made by the Supreme Court and by Congress, see Mark C. Gordon, Differing
Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, in
YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW
FEDERALISM 187, 188-89 (1996).
8. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(Dec. 1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN].
9. Id. at23-32. See, e.g., Recommendation 2 at 24-25 (advocating that criminal activity should be
prosecuted in federal court "only in those instances when state court prosecution is not appropriate or
where federal interests are paramount," and detailing federal interests as those that involve "substantial
multistate or international aspects," "complex commercial or institutional enterprises most effectively
prosecuted using federal resources," "widespread state or local government corruption," or as raising
"highly sensitive issues.. perceived as being more objectively prosecuted within the federal system");
Recommendation 6 at 28-29 (urging Congress to refrain from creating federal civil jurisdiction except
when justified by federal interests, such as when cases arise under the United States Constitution, or
cannot be "dealt with satisfactorily at the state level," involve foreign relations or federal government
officials, are disputes among states, or affect "substantial interstate or international disputes"). These
recommendations have been adopted by the Judicial Conference, while the commentary in the report is
that of the Planning Committee. See L. Ralph Mecham, Cover Letter "To All Interested Parties," id.
at 1 (Dec. 15, 1995).
10. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 2, at 446-47; Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of
Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J 1029, 1077-81 (1995) (attempting to craft such principles without
pejorative implications).
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perceived to be destructive, or may promulgate laws that are inefficient or
insufficient (on some normative metric, sometimes cast as a "race to the
bottom""), that disuniformity entailed in state variation itself inflicts social
harm, and that claims of state rights are coded attempts to serve particular
visions of political life at odds with what are asserted to be United States'
values.
12
I find myself uneasy about the choices. In the arena of federalism that I
know best, which is the courts, current practices do not fit within these
parameters. As I detail below,13 in a variety of settings, state and federal
judges are working together, literally functioning in some instances as a
merged court system, to respond to problems for which the characterization
"state" or "federal" fails to capture the parameters. Reporters publish cases
that include the captions of both state and federal courts, 4 and lawyers send
me documents such as consent decrees created by virtue of coordination of
judges from a group of states. 5 The practice of these judges and lawyers, like
the creation of interstate compacts, of national, non-federal organizations, and
of state-based regional programs, all crisscross state and federal lines but are
11. Analyses of the "race" are provided by Alvin K. Klevorick, The Race to the Bottom in a
Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy, in YALE LAW AND POLicY REVIEW/YALE
JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 177 (1996); Schwartz,
supra note 2, and Swire, supra note 3. For concern about "objectify[ing] this notion of the bottom,"
see Colleen M. Grogan, Commentary, Block Grants and the Meaning of Entitlements, in YALE LAW
AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW
FEDERALISM 355, 357 (1996); see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
LAW (1993) (asserting that "genius" of United States' federalism is its ability to generate competition
by states).
12. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 2, at 448; Butler& Macey, supra note 3, at42. See generally
Blumstein, supra note 2. Compare Schwartz, supra note 2, at 367-68, arguing that in the products
liability arena, theories of state law as structurally biased against out-of-staters have intellectual appeal
but do not capture state rule making because of several complicating factors.
13. See infra Part 11.
14. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Districts Asbestos Litig., In re New York City Asbestos
Litigation, 737 F. Supp. 735 (E.& S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1990) (denying motion to disqualify
special master appointed for those cases); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., In re Joint E. & S.
Districts Asbestos Lit., 123 B.R. 7 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1990) (requiring report on use
of funds); In re Joint E. & S. Districts Asbestos Litig., In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 129
F.R.D. 434 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1990) (appointing special master/referee), discussed infra
note 82 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Cox v. Shell Oil Co., Chancery Court for Obion County, Tenn. (Civ. Action No.
18,844, Nov. 17, 1995), a class action settlement involving the coordination among judges from
California, Alabama, and Tennessee that, in the words of the court's opinion, represent an
"unprecedented effort by three state courts to coordinate and settle competing national class actions."
Id. at 3. (on file with the author). A California state judge sat as a "settlement judge" for all three state
courts, id. at 8, media notices were provided in newspapers in "13 targeted states (Alabama, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia) and the District of Columbia." Id. at 11. In addition to television and news
services, notice was also provided "through various online computer services." Id. at 12. According to
an order from the California Superior Court, the coordination resulted from conference calls by the three
state judges (and presumably in accordance with requests or agreement by at least some of the litigants'
lawyers). See Meers v. Shell Oil Co., Minute Order Setting Settlement Conference (Sup. Ct. Calif.,
Oct. 12, 1995) (both on file with the author).
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not in focus in United States legal federalism.
This diversity of arrangements among and between state and federal actors
stands in contrast to the federalism described in case law and in a good deal of
legal commentary,'6 which is both formalistic and unresponsive to an array
of efforts-both within the United States and beyond this country's bor-
ders 7--to reformat arrangements crafted in earlier eras. While the conveners
of the symposium have chosen to describe their topic as "Constructing a New
Federalism," many of the participants note that not much seems all that new.
For example, in his essay Devolution's Price,'8 Professor Peterson offers a
description about what might be termed "circular" federalism, in which
government assistance to needy individuals cycles through stages-based
initially on state governance that, because of its failings, produces a crisis that
licenses federal action, but which in turn becomes or is perceived to be so
cumbersome that support erodes, followed by efforts to defederalize the activity
and "return" it to state governance. 19 He predicts, however, that the cycle
could again produce conditions leading to "[d]emands for a national solu-
tion."' Similarly, Professor Melnick offers as a "likely chain of events" that
current efforts to restructure welfare will result in cuts to "clearly needy"
individuals, followed by popular attention that will prompt states to seek
additional federal funding, which will be accompanied by restrictions enforced
at least in part by federal courts. He concludes by asking: "Sounds famil-
iar." 21
The familiar pattern that Professors Peterson and Melnick sketch is not only
the repeated interplay between state and federal governance but also the narrow
set of choices that such a pattern suggests-state or federal governance. The
alternatives appear to be either singular state legislation or a congressional
statute. In the context of federal courts' jurisprudence, the choices are often
posited as either state court authority or federal court "oversight" or
"intervention."I And upon occasion, when claims are made that the activity
is better termed "cooperative" federalism, commentators such as Professor
Mashaw argue that the term is a misnomer, at least in the entitlement context,
16. Perhaps in contrast, Professor Scheiber argues that, during the 1960s, some theorizing of
federalism matched the expansionist aspirations of that period. See Scheiber, supra note 7, at 269-78.
17. As I write this essay, the press is reporting a joint alliance of American Airlines and British
Air, a partner with US Air. See, e.g., Adam Bryant, Rivals of American and British Air Quickly Assail
New Alliance as Anticompetitive, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1996, at C4.
18. Paul Peterson, Devolution's Price, in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON
REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEw FEDERAuSM If1 (1996).
19. Id. at 120-21.
20. Id. at 121.
21. Melnick, supra note 4, at 350.
22. Such are the terms of a good deal of the discussion of habeas corpus litigation.
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because of a lack of programmatic and fiscal options.' Moreover, even if apt,
the "cooperation" discussed tends to focus on what is sometimes termed a
"partnership between the States and the Federal Government"24 and might
also be known as conditional federal spending programs.' State-state relations
are not much in view. In sum, the debate comes with well-marked parameters
about the nature and role of states as contrasted with the federal government
and the respective spheres of each.' That the current buzz
word-"devolution"-is new should not be confused with the idea of innovative
opportunities. 27
Consider how certain fixed elements structure much of the contemporary
doctrine and discussion.28 First, states are conceived to be singular actors,
sometimes in "competition" with one other but infrequently thought to be
acting in concert with others, either as joint venturers, as members of regions,
or as participants in national organizations.2 9 States are thus not only
individual entities, fixed in time, but also unitary actors rather than parts of
subgroups within the nation or in any dimension different than when they first
23. Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 4, at 297; see also Sugarman, supra note 4, at 124. The phrase
.cooperative federalism" is often used as a description of federal benefits programs (see, e.g.,
Connecticut Dep't. of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 532, n. 22 (1985); Heckler v.
Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 189 (1985) (citing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968)), as well as in the
environmental and energy area. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982), citing Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 289, n.30 (1981). At times, joint state and
federal efforts to fight crime are also termed "cooperative federalism." See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1964) (describing governments as "waging a united front against many types
of criminal activity"). In an earlier draft of his commentary, Professor Schwartz also noted the
possibility of some form of common law developments and voluntary efforts, resulting in a gradual
movement towards uniformity across states.
24. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992); cited in United States Dep't of Energy v.
Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 633 (1992) (White, J., joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concurring and
dissenting in part). An exception is the work of the National Association of Governors in crafting what
became the Low Level Radioactive Waste Act, invalidated in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), discussed infra notes 61, 165 & 168.
25. For arguments critical of congressional efforts to use its spending powers in ways claimed to
exceed its regulatory powers, see Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1911 (1995).
26. See Scheiber, supra note 7, at 228-29 (arguing that contemporary claims are rooted in important
traditions of federalism).
27. For discussion of "devolution" itself, see Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Federalism
Debate, in YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMPOSIUM:
CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALISM 1, 15 (1996). Schuck argues that the "pervasiveness of devolution"
prompts a return to the longstanding "fundamental normative question... [of] which conditions will
suffice to rebut [the] presumption of state diversity" and support a federal government's override. Id.
28. Compare Scheiber's analysis of what he terms the "general features" of the first century of
United States federalism, specifically its protection of the institution of slavery, its reliance on the state
and federal governments as operating in "separate spheres" or "dual federalism" which resulted in
"significant variations" on substantive policies, and the vertical and horizontal tensions that existed.
Scheiber, supra note 7, at 233-42. Scheiber also argues that late twentieth-century federalism doctrine
"incorporated essential elements of the old federal creed." Id. at 295.
29. See discussion infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. In this symposium, both Scheiber,
supra note 7, at 285, and Gordon, supra note 7, at 222-23, mention such organizations.
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entered the Union.1°
Second, states are seen as "natural" holders of power, as the presump-
tively correct level at which authority resides.3 ' To the extent the federal
government's role expands, that activity is often termed an "interference" or
"intervention." Given such terms, it is not surprising that discussion of state
authority is in turn accompanied by claims of "tradition" and of "preservation"
of state functions.
Third, the federal government is equated with all forms of national power;
champions of greater federal governance often argue it reflects a necessary
evolution of nationalizing forces. Missing from discussions are forms of
national power that are not federal, such as nationwide associations created by
state governments, and other forms of inter-state, non-federal relationships,
such as interstate compacts and joint ventures.32
Fourth, while the experiences of this century (including the New Deal, the
Civil Rights movement, and the contemporary call for devolution) demand a
30. Daniel Rodriguez also notes that states are assumed to be identical, rather than differentiated
by their distinctive market powers or resources, by their heterogeneity or homogeneity, or by variations
in their internal governance structures and capacities. Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 149-55 (also calling
for federalism's attention to the effects of intrastate structures on interstate regulation and competition).
Gordon shares my concern that the approaches to federalism are what he terms "static," focusing on
the Supreme Court's approach and its role in maintaining certain conceptions. Gordon, supra note 7,
at 204-07.
31. This view is longstanding. See Scheiber, supra note 7, at 240 (detailing "federalism creed,"
in which at beginning of this century, "most American political leaders regularly paid lip service to the
idea that smaller government was better than larger" and that power properly resided in the states).
Scheiber also argues that such a creed is being relied upon in contemporary discussions. Id. According
to Paul Marquardt, a parallel principle of "subsidiarity" ("decisions are taken as closely as possible to
the citizen") is on the rise within the European Community. Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and
Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 617 (1994) (quoting preamble to 1992
Maastricht Treaty). Marquardt argues that the principle works not to advance national authority (for
which it is sometimes deployed within Europe) but rather to support regional or local level decision
making "at the expense of the nation-state." Id. at 638. Eleanor M. Fox, Vision of Europe: Lessons for
the World, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 379, 386 (1994), disagrees.
32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10 ("the Compact Clause"), discussed in Felix Frankfurter
& James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34
YALE L.J. 685, 691-708 (1925) (detailing compacts related to land and boundaries, navigation, crime,
uniform legislation, natural resources, utilities, and taxation; discussing modem technology-such as
the development of electrical power and of new modes of transportation-as demonstrating the need for
coordinated state action and experimentation within the country) [hereinafter Frankfurter & Landis, The
Compact Clause]. As of 1970, more than 100 formal compacts (involving anywhere from 2 to 50 states,
as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) addressed a variety of subjects, including flood
control, mass transit, energy conservation, and corrections. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTs 1783-1970, at 4 (1971); VINCENT V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE
COOPERATION: A STUDY OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT CLAUSE (1935); FREDERICK L. ZmmERmAN
& MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERsTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925 (1951) (describing limited use of
compacts prior to the 1920s and the creation of Port Authority and the Colorado River compacts as
marking new era of use and categorizing compacts by functions such as those that regulate boundaries
or create shared administrative structures); Kevin J. Heron, The Interstate Compact in Transition: From
Cooperative StateAction to Congressionally CoercedAgreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1985).
For discussions of the history, some of the early agreements and compacts, and the Court's
interpretation of the respective roles of the states and of the Congress, see United States Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-67, 479-83 (1978) (majority and dissenting opinions).
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conception of power ebbing and flowing between state and federal government,
that power is imagined to run in uni-bed rivers and not to flood in unpredict-
able directions. For example, proponents of devolution envision a set of
government powers that have sat in the federal government but are now
moving "back to the states."33 United States federalism is thus cast as
traveling within narrow channels.
These implicit and sometimes explicit assumptions can be understood as
constituting a "categorical" or an "essentialist" federalism, by which I mean
that it ascribes to states and the federal government particular activities as
belonging to them, insists on the naturalness of the divisions, and assumes
these bi-polar options. This construction of federalism is more closely
associated with lawyers and judges than with commentators from other
disciplines (within the United States) who work on federalism. For example,
some political scientists rely on metaphors like "marble cake,"" 4 "picket
fences,"' and "matrixes"36 to capture the interdependent governance of
local, state, and national institutions.37 In contrast, lawyers and judges are
reluctant to stress the webs and connections that make problematic claims of
apriori distinctive functions of the various levels of government and their courts.3"
33. See Schuck's discussion of devolution's proponents, supra note 27, at 3-4.
34. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, Part H, 60-152 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966)
("The Marble Cake of Government"). Jerry Mashaw, for one, has hesitancies about "marble cakes" as
governance structures because, he argues, "layer cake" federalism blurs less than does marble cake
federalism the "lines of authority and democratic accountability." See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note
4, at 319. On the other hand, he explains that "marble cake" federalism is based on pragmatic responses
to dislike of central administration. Id. at 322.
35. Del S. Wright, Revenue Sharing and Structural Features of Federalism, 419 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCL 100, 109-10 (1975) (relying on former North Carolina Governor Terry
Sanford's metaphor and elaborating on the competition by professionals for funds, jurisdiction, and
political support, and analyzing the discrete interests and points of view based on those actors' positions)
[hereinafter Wright, Revenue Sharing].
36. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 37,200 (1987); see also Melnick, supra note 4,
at 341 (discussing "declining political influence of subnational governments" and that "[g]eographic
mobility and the higher visibility of national policies have reduced the public's attachment to state and
local governments"). Further examination of such interdependencies is provided by Larry Kramer's
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1496 (1994) (discussing ways in which power is
exercised by state actors in era when two party system is in decline).
37. Another metaphor-offered in a recent collaboration between a law professor and social
scientist-is "mush, rather than marble cake." Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 933 (1994).
38. As both Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 4, at 298, and Scheiber, supra note 7, at 271, discuss,
lawyers, justices, and politicians have used other terms for federalism, including "cooperative"
federalism (see note 23, supra) and "creative federalism," a phrase associated with Lyndon Johnson's
speech of May 22, 1964, PuBLIc PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1963-64, VOL.
I at 704, 706 (Remarks at the University of Michigan) (discussing conferences to be held "on the cities,
on natural beauty, on the quality of education, and on other emerging challenges" from which to
develop "new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism, between the National Capital and the
leaders of local communities").
However, in much of the literature of the relationship between state and federal courts, federal
courts are posited as intruders; see, e.g., the discussion of federal intervention of Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1970), and a good deal of the rhetoric is about "oversight" or what Peter Shuck has called
the federal "override." Schuck, supra note 27, at 4. That terminology fits with more recent descriptions
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I aspire to a conversation within law that relies less on preexisting
categories and that searches among evolving practices to learn something new
about federalism in the United States. "State" and "federal" interests are not
fixed sets39 but are interactive and interdependent conceptions that vary over
time." As is illustrated by today's "devolution" discourse (insisting, for
example that nationally-regulated income supports and speed limits on
highways" are better suited to state governance), what today appears to be or
is claimed to be "local" or "national" may in another decade be the opposite
or may have moved into other spheres, be they denominated "local," 42
"international,"43 or "private." My point is not only that particular subject
matter may go back and forth between state and federal governance but also
that the tradition of allocation itself is one constantly being reworked;
periodically, events prompt the revisiting of state or federal authority, and the
of congressional activity as "regulatory or coercive federalism," and refers to legislation preempting
state regulation, conditioning federal funding, and issuing mandates. See John Kincaid, Foreword: The
New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 933-38 (1995). For
other visions of the relationship, see infra note 106 and accompanying text.
39. Compare Kramer, supra note 36, at 1496 (arguing that, while the Constitution envisioned some
"boundaries-areas outside the reach of federal law, [t]hose boundaries have almost disappeared today")
with William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of
American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1360-61, 1371, 1397-1400 (1994) (delineating certain
decisions of governance, relating to public safety and promotion of economic development, and locating
them in states as "traditional state functions," as contrasted with issues that Eskridge and Ferejohn
assume have greater "externalities" affecting nonresidents or are part of "widely shared constitutional
values" and thereby located as national functions). The difficulty with the Eskridge/Ferejohn approach
is not only the one they recognize-the problem of identifying "what constitutes a widely shared
constitutional value," id. at 1399, but also that "externalities" are not fixed and technology alters the
understanding of what affects "outsiders," as well as how to conceptualize in and "outside." See infra
text accompanying note 99.
40. My commentary here is thus tied to and influenced by efforts in other contexts to de-naturalize
and to question the validity and utility of socially-embedded categories in essentialist terms. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
Essentialist assumptions, that race or gender carries particular characteristics, turn out to be deeply
linked to culture, both in the identification of certain characteristics as tied to race and gender and in
the ability to perceive those characteristics as telling. See generally RUTH FRANKENBERG, THE SOCIAL
CONSrRUcTION OF WHrTENESS: WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS (1993).
41. See Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 205 (1996) (repealing 23 U.S.C. § 154, the national maximum
speed limit provision).
42. See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073,
1114-15 (1994) (arguing that family law is of increasing import at the national level and deserving of
federal judicial attention); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991) (explaining that while federal courts describe
themselves as not involved in family law, a good deal of the federal docket-including pensions,
bankruptcy, tax, immigration, and federal benefits law-affect family life). In June of 1996, some
members of Congress proposed, in an effort to block same-sex marriages, a federal definition of
marriage. See Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
43. See Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1461-
62 (1994) (stating that state authority over alcohol and taxation may be affected by GATT).
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lines move.'
In addition to the idea of both moving and fluid lines, another dimension
to be stressed in this "noncategorical" approach to federalism is the variety of
jurisdictional arrangements that lace United States history. In a self-conscious
transitional effort to alter law's appreciation for this variety, noncategorical
federalism emphasizes the less conventional iterations of relationships among
states and the federal government. Central, thus, to such a federalism story are
moments when states enter into compacts45 (such as the creation of the Port
Authority46 or the Interstate Agreement on Detainers47), when states adopt
uniform laws (such as the Uniform Criminal Extradition Actn), enter into
reciprocal agreements,49 or create "active administrative" multistate agen-
cies,50 or when state and federal judges sit together creating a kind of joint
court, found in no extant law book.
44. Recall that in the 1930s, the courts debated the power of the federal government to develop
hydraulic power plants. See Joseph C. Swidler & Robert H. Marquis, TVA in Court: A Study of TVA's
Constitutional Litigation, 32 IOwA L. REV. 296 (1947).
45. U.S. CONSr., art. I, § 10 ("the Compact Clause"), for which, sometimes, the consent of
Congress is required. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-60, 471
(1978) (rejecting literal reading of Clause and applying functional test under which agreements that do
not "encroach" on federal power do not require congressional consent while "most multilateral compacts
have been submitted for congressional approval .... [that] historical practice" was not a requirement
that all be so approved). A narrower view of the Clause is provided in Abraham C. Weinfeld, WhatDid
the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 453
(1935-36).
46. "From the point of view of geography, commerce, and engineering, the Port of New York is
an organic whole. Politically, the port is split between the law-making of two States, independent but
futile in their respective spheres." Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause, supra note 32, at 697.
The politics of regional efforts during the 1950s and 1960s are analyzed in JAMESON W. DOIG,
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION POLITICS AND THE NEW YORK REGION (1966); congressional
oversight is discussed by Emanuel Celler (then Chair of the House Judiciary Committee and in a dispute
with the Port Authority) in Congress, Compacts, and Interstate Authorities, 26 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 682 (1961). The legal status of the Port Authority is addressed in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (resolving conflict between Second and Third Circuits about
whether suits for monetary damages against PATH could be filed in federal courts or whether Eleventh
Amendment's protections of state treasuries should insulate such organizations from suits).
47. "Initially drafted by the Council of State Governments in 1956 ... , the Agreement establishes
procedures by which one jurisdiction may obtain temporary custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another
jurisdiction.. . ." Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 435 n.1 (1981). Cuyler held that the Compact
Clause applies only to those interstate agreements that provide "any combination tending to the increase
of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States," and that Congress may approve such compacts implicitly or explicitly, that the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers had such approval, and therefore, that a federal question was presented about
the interpretation of the Agreement. Id. at 440-42 (citation omitted). As of 1981, forty-eight States, the
United States, and the District of Columbia had agreed to it. Id. at 435, n.l.
48. Uniform Extradition Act (U.E.A.), 11 U.L.A 97 (1995) (enacted first in 1926 and revised in
1936, Table of Adoptions).
49. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., 10 Governors in WestAgree to Create On-line College, N.Y.
TIMS, June 25, 1996, at A9 ("Without so much as a ritual shovel to break the ground ... , the
governors of 10 Western states today laid an intangible cornerstone for a new 'virtual university'.
50. See, e.g., the Multistate Tax Commission, upheld in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,479 (1978). The Commission is headquartered in the District of Columbia,
and according to 1995 data, has 20 members.
Federalism's Options
For more than a century, participants in institutions have recognized the
need to cross state lines without becoming instruments of the United States
government. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has worked since 1890 in response to the felt need for coordination in
laws across states.51 Other state-based national organizations include the
National Conference of State Legislatures,52 the National Association of
Attorneys General,53 the National Governors' Association, 4 the National
League of Cities,55 and the United States Conference of Mayors,56 all of
which play important roles in shaping local, regional, and national policyY
The point of noncategorical federalism is not only to appreciate changing
understandings of federal and of state boundaries but also to emphasize that the
two need not be synonymous either with national or local governance.58
51. Frankfurter & Landis, Compact Clause, supra note 32, at 688.
52. The National Conference of State Legislatures, founded in 1975, describes its aims to be to
improve "the quality and effectiveness of state legislatures," as well as "to ensure states a strong,
cohesive voice in the federal decision-making process" and "to foster interstate communication and
cooperation." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, pt. 1, at 694 (29th ed. 1995) [hereinafter
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS].
53. The National Association of Attorneys General, founded in 1907, sponsors national legal
education seminars, including on United States Supreme Court practice. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 52, at 693; see also Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and
Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 842 (1989) (discussing Association as example of
interstate cooperation, considering conditions under which voluntary cooperation are likely, and degree
to which some of the policies may raise constitutional questions).
54. The National Governors' Association, founded in 1908, describes itself as a "vehicle through
which governors influence the development and implementation of national policy." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 52, at 694-95. According to Larry Sabato, the Association (called the
National Governors' Conference until 1977) was convened by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1908,
but was not very influential until the 1960s. In 1966, the Association created an Office for Federal-State
Relations in Washington, D.C.; in the 1970s its research arm, the Center for Policy Research and
Analysis, provided important support (and subsequently became independent), and by the 1980s, it had
expanded its professional staff, regional work, and national activities. LARRY SABATO, GOODBYE TO
GOOD-TIME CHARLM: THE AMERICAN GOVERNORSHIP TRANSFORMED 170-75 (2d ed. 1983).
55. The National League of Cities, founded in 1924, is a federation that pursued a "national
municipal policy" and "represents municipalities before Congress and federal agencies." ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 52, at 672.
56. The United States Conference of Mayors, founded in 1932, is comprised of mayors of cities
with populations of more than 30,000, to promote "cooperation between cities and the federal
government." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 52, at 673.
57. Kramer, supra note 36, at 1552-53. Some speak of such organizations as constituting a "Big
Seven" that affect national policy. See Scheiber, supra note 7, at 285; Wright, Revenue Sharing, supra
note 35, at 111; see also GRODZINS, supra note 34 (discussing cross currents in influence that run
national, state, and local).
58. As Justice Frankfurter put it, "The Constitution did not purport to exhaust imagination and
resourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships." New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6, 10
(1959). In that case, Frankfurter upheld the Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Within or Without the State in Criminal Proceedings, a law enacted in forty-two states and in Puerto
Rico but not sanctioned by Congress, and also cited his essay, with Landis, about the "extra-
constitutional forms of legal invention for the solution of problems touching more than one state." This
case is itself an example of the effects of technological change and the needs of the judiciary; the Court
rejected "right to travel" and "privilege and immunities" and "due process" claims made by a person
in Florida, summoned to appear before a grand jury in New York. By means of the act, each
participating state could compel the attendance of witnesses outside the borders in proceedings within
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Moreover, this approach prompts inquiry about the role of states as sources of
nationalizing activity (through such processes as state by state adoption of
uniform laws or proposals to Congress from state-based national associations)
and about when to distinguish decentralization from claims of individual state
autonomy and governance.59
In the remainder of this essay, I use current developments within and across
state and federal judiciaries to illustrate the distance between contemporary
practices and federalism's rhetoric. With increasing frequency, state and federal
judges work together on litigations that sprawl across (rather than respect)
jurisdictional lines. I also discuss the pressures that contemporary technology,
economic, and social practices are imposing on jurisdictional authority that has
long been justified by physical presence of people and things within particular
territorial boundaries.
This discussion is provided to make plain the pull toward reiteration of
familiar statements of federalism and the possibilities of other arrangements
among state and federal actors. From such practices might come consideration
of a host of legally-sanctioned alterations. One option, of which I have urged
consideration elsewhere, is the formal creation of a set of courts that are
neither state nor federal but have authority over disputes that involve litigants
a state. With videoconferencing, appearances may well be able to happen without travel back to the
requesting state.
59. Such non-categorical federalism carries with it a skepticism I want to make explicit-about the
capacity of scholars to offer singular justifications or unified theories about the values of federalism. I
have benefitted from those scholars who offer structural approaches to federalism. See, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994); Richard
Briffault, What About the "Ism?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1994); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 39; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988) [hereinafter Fallon, The Ideologies of
Federal Courts Law]; Kramer, supra note 36; Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism:
Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 37. I
am leery, however, of efforts to sift the meaning down to a simple core that endures over time.
Moreover, under a non-categorical view, the states are not a singular unit to be compared as a whole
to the federal government but rather understood as likely to evidence diverse attitudes. Further, the
ongoing workings of federalist arrangements are seen as continually renegotiated.
In this sense, noncategorical federalism shares some of Briffault's critique that what he terms
"normative federalisms" (justifications based on claims of what federalism accomplishes) are an
amalgam of historical example, empiricism, intuition and aspirations and thus unsatisfactory. Briffault,
supra, at 1324-28. Briffault's proposed solution, however, that states and federalism exist based on
constitutional stipulation, fails to solve the problem that has prompted the search for normative
justification-that having said that states exist as a legal matter does not answer what degrees of local,
state, regional, and national governance should result, even in constitutional doctrinal terms. Briffault
proposed that, when faced with such questions, courts should examine "the impact of national action
on the capacities of the states to be independent lawmakers and alternative power centers within the
federal framework, rather than by a more open-ended and value-laden assessment of the conflicting
political values said to be advanced or impaired by state or national action." Id. at 1352. The difficulty
is that the very assessments for which Briffault called are themselves "open-ended and value-laden." Id.




of more than one state.60 Such national courts (as contrasted with federal
courts) could join other institutions that are national associations of state-based
actors and that reflect the increasingly common phenomenon of inevitably
overlapping work among actors empowered by municipal, state, tribal and/or
federal governments.
Such courts are but one option, extrapolated from the practice of state and
federal judges, lawyers, and litigants embroiled in contemporary disputes.
Other examples come from inventions of both state and federal legislators, such
as the scheme for radioactive waste disposal (that was created at the suggestion
of state governors to provide for regional inter-state dependencies but, at the
behest of a non-complying state, was invalidated by the United States Supreme
Court61) and congressional efforts to rely on an amalgam of state, tribal, and
federal executive decision making to deal with the question of commercial
gaming run by Indian tribes (also invalidated in part by the United States
Supreme Court).'a
Be it state compacts, ad hoc regulatory arrangements of a group of states
(sometimes prompted by or in response to federal regulation),6' mechanisms
to adopt uniform laws, or the creation of new organizations to affect national
political and legal life, actors-in and out of government-are trying an array
60. See Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective
Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 254-63 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik,
History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts].
61. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1992) (majority opinion); 189-93 (opinion
of Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
According to the dissenters, the bill was the product of intensive efforts by state governors to find
compromises and "was very much the product of cooperative federalism, in which the States bargained
among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction." Id. at 194. Assuming that this
version of the development of the Act is accurate, then the Court's doctrine permits either lone or
minority dissenting states (perhaps reticent during negotiations or subsequently governed by a party with
different views) to invalidate such agreements by resort to the federal courts-hardly a scenario of
democratic processes at their best.
62. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996). That legislation evolved
after the Court determined, absent congressional authorization, states could not bar gambling on Indian
reservations. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). The Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1992), gave the states a role in dealing with what
was called "class III" gaming, such as casino games, slot machines, dog racing and lotteries, by
providing them with a federally-enforceable obligation to negotiate in "good faith" with tribes over the
such activities to create "Tribal-State Compacts." Also included was the creation of a National Indian
Gaming Commission and regulatory authority for the Secretary of the Interior.
63. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 3, at 82 (describing agreement of twelve eastern states and District
of Columbia to adopt California-created auto emission standards) [Yale need page numbers/ new draft
at 17, near fn. 55]. According to litigation about that agreement ("the Northeast Ozone Transport
Commission"), several states signed a "letter of understanding" to follow New York in its adoption of
some of California's regulations. The agreement itself was borne of federal law, both regulating car
emissions and permitting others to "piggy-back" on the California standards, which were permitted to
differ from national regulatory requirements. Manufacturers' efforts to stop Eastern states from using
the California standards are described in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. v. New York State Dep't of
Environmental Conservation, 79 F.3d 1298 (2d Cir. 1996); 17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994), and in
American Auto. Mfrs. v. Commissioner Mass. Dep't of Environmental Protection, 31 F.3d 18 (lst Cir.
1994).
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of arrangements to respond to both new and old problems. When one focuses
on these practices, one finds a series of attempts to rely on differing forms of
agreements and actions to generate more than the categorical terms of either
state or federal governance. With these variations in mind, options expand
beyond the bipolar list of "either state or federal." In short, there is more here,
within the United States, than the models of federalism one gleans from
Supreme Court decisions and many law review articles.
I do not advance such examples as ultimate answers to issues of federalism;
I do not believe any such answer exists or that relationships among the
participants in United States federalism will remain static. What I do believe
is that it is time to depart from the history of dichotomous alternatives (of
either a state or federal domain) and of essentialized images (of both states and
the federal government), so as to investigate ongoing, and to imagine new,
institutional arrangements that embody the interdependence of participants
within the United States.
That such new institutional arrangements need to be stressed is evidenced
by both popular and academic despair-ranging from calls to reject the two
major parties to claims of the end of the nation-state.' 4 I think-with guarded
optimism-that upon telling another story of twentieth century United States
federalism (which includes a somewhat celebratory recitation of invention,
attends to changes prompted by technology, focuses on the increased lack of
insularity of the population, of states, and of the federal government, that
emphasizes regional organizations both within and between states, that
acknowledges Indian tribes as important loci of governance, and that
appreciates the declining salience of physical land that has been the formative
aspect of states-and nations-in centuries past), other possibilities help provide
a sense of capacity and competency to meet a world that seems both familiar
and full of lost promise.
As I think about how to speak with optimism about United States'
federalism and whether it is plausible that the adjective "new" is a part of the
discussion, I find myself wondering about Jean Monnet, a man whose name I
first learned not in the United States (where in my experience, he is rarely
mentioned) but while a student one summer in Canada. Monnet is the "grand
man" of the European Community, a man who imagined a connection among
European countries at a time when it seemed unimaginablea Today, German
64. See Melnick, supra note 4, at 344-45 (discussing declining confidence in government, as
evidenced by polls); JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE 4 (Victoria Elliot trans.,
1995) ("It is time to realize that the idea of the nation that Europe gave to the world is perhaps only an
ephemeral political form, a European exception, a precarious transition between the age of kinds and
the 'neoimperial' age."); MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 1-8, 317-51 (1996).
65. Robert Schuman is another. Celebratory biographies of Monnet are provided by MERRY &
SERGE BROMBERGER, JEAN MONNET AND THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE (Elaine P. Halperin trans.,
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beer and Greek feta cheese are affected by standards set by the European
community, now comprised of 15 countries.66 Jean Monnet and his powerful
inventiveness is virtually invisible in United States discussions of legal
federalism.' I am not here making an argument for comparative federalism
but rather for inventive federalism. It is time to try to imagine more than we
(in the United States) have by way of federalism's options and to see (in extant
legal institutions) how ongoing, vital alterations have given rise to more than
we think we have.
II. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS: THE PERMEABLE BOUNDARIES OF
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
I have spoken at a very general level about the problems of current
conceptualization of United States legal federalism. In this section, I use the
example of the federal courts to illustrate how the assumption of the fixed
boundaries of state and federal courts misdescribes a segment of contemporary
practice and limits the potential for responding to perceived problems of the
federal courts. Further, the commonplace predicates in federal courts
discussions (like those in the more general topic of federalism of which federal
courts are a subset) rarely take into account how much the context has changed
and how territorial boundaries, a bedrock (pun intended) of court authority, are
crumbling. "The federal courts" offer but one example of radical changes that
are hard to acknowledge and reliance on familiar legal and rhetorical categories
that obscure the need to come to terms with current-let alone future-changes.
The alteration within the federal courts most salient to this symposium is
one I term the "permeable boundaries" of federal and state courts.6" While
1969); and FRANCOIS DUCHENE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OFINTERDEPENDENCE (1994);
"Monnet's vision of Europe and its articulation since 1945" are described by CLIFFORD HACKETr,
CAUTIOUS REVOLUTION: THE EUROPEAN UNION ARRIVES 11 (2d ed. 1995). A more critical view is
offered by Kevin Featherstone, Jean Monnet and the "Democratic Deficit" in the European Union, 32
J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 149, 150 (1994) (faulting Monnet for his investment of European integration
with a "particular character ... marked by technocracy and elitism" that has weakened the
Community's "democratic legitimacy").
66. The question of whether national laws should govern "traditional" foods, such as German beer,
French bread, Greek feta cheese, was much debated; the current compromise is to permit certain
products, as listed by the European Parliament, as exempt from the directives on food additives. See
Food Additives: Parliament Votes to Protect Traditional Products, European Information Service: Agri
Service Int'l (Jan. 19, 1996), No. 432; see also 70 European Community Update 7 (Oct. 12, 1995)
(Court of Justice declared illegal German rules prohibiting the marketing of Mars ice cream). The
conflict between Great Britain and the EC over destruction of cattle in response to the threat of "mad
cow" disease is another example.
67. While such had been my impression, I thought some empiricism in order. Beginning in the
early 1980s, law reviews were data based in a progressively expanding list. Looking at the more than
200 law reviews online in June of 1996, my research assistants Kavita Amar and Amy Melner searched
for his name and found him invoked 23 times, discussed briefly 18 times, and considered at some length
once, by Marquardt, supra note 31, at 621-22.
68. Several other changes have occurred that also mark the distance between description and
practice within the federal courts, including the creation of a fourth set of federal judges; two sets of
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federal courts' jurisprudence is anchored in the assumption that the state and
federal courts are both bounded and distinct, that premise is being undermined
in practice. Judges and lawyers are inventing ways to join the systems together
under the rubric of what is now termed "judicial federalism," 69 reflecting the
shared understanding of state and federal judges of the interrelatedness and
interdependence of federal and state court systems.
The idea of state and federal judges working together is relatively recent;7'
during the 1980s, federal and state judges began to cross jurisdictional lines to
talk about shared problems. One impetus for such joint work is large-scale
aggregated litigation, such as mass torts.7" While formally based either in
state or federal court, resolution of these cases often aspires to "global
peace"-a settlement that includes all pending cases, be they filed in state or
federal courts. Other incentives to coordinate come from concerns about
non-life tenured judges - magistrate and bankruptcy judges-who decide a growing segment of federal
cases and comprise a fourth, bottom tier. Agencies also have become "courts," rendering adjudicative
decisions on a caseload larger than that of the federal judicial docket itself.
Another major revision within the federal adjudicatory landscape is the change in the unit of decision
making. Over the past decades, the aggregation of civil cases, the bringing together of claims of many
different individuals to prepare them for trial, settlement, or other mode of disposition, has moved from
the periphery closer to the core. See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, "54 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation"].
As game theory pervades the discussion of such large scale cases, (see, e.g., Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv.
497, 528-57 (1991); Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1821 (1995)), judges, special masters, and other para-judges bob in and out as one of many sets of
"players," which also reflects another change about the nature of the decision making process itself. The
pretrial phase at the trial level has taken on greater importance, and alternative dispute resolution has
become a part of both trial and appellate court processes.
Writing in 1955, political scientist Jack Peltason stated that the "central activity" of federal judges
was "to make decisions, issue orders, and write opinions." JACK W. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN
THE POLMCAL PROCESS 1-6, 7, 65 (1955). At the trial level, that description is no longer accurate. In
1982, 1 offered the term "managerial judges" to capture the shift injudicial attitude asjudges established
oversight of the pretrial process. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). In
1990, contemporary social scientists Wolf Heydebrand and Carroll Seron detailed the "quiet revolution
taking place in American courts" and provided a rich analysis of why the judiciary had moved toward
what they termed the "technocratic rationalization ofjustice." WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON,
RATIONALIZING JUSTICE 1, 13 (1990). In 1994, Stephen Yeazell considered seventy-five years of
procedural innovation and concluded that revised rules of procedure had the effects of reorienting the
litigation process to the pretrial phase, expanding the powers of trial level judges, and contracting
authority of the appellate courts. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern
Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631. A transformation in the methodology of courts is well underway
and will require different modes of gauging the legitimacy of judicial actions. For further discussion,
see Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994); Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts,
supra note 60, 187-216; Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for
Settlement and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471
(1994).
69. See, e.g., the chapter of the LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 21-38, that bears that name.
70. See J. Clifford Wallace, Before State and Federal Courts Clash, JUDGES' J., Fall 1985, at 36
(describing the Ninth Circuit's efforts in working with states in state-federal councils).
71. See Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, & Deborah Hensler, Individuals within the Aggregate:
Representation, Relationships, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1996); Resnik, From "Cases" to
"Litigation," supra note 68.
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prisoners' filings, rising criminal caseloads, and interest in court-based
regulation of attorneys, all of which have resulted in decisions by leaders of
both sets of judiciaries to create institutional arrangements to link them.'
In 1990, the Conference of Chief Justices of the State Courts and the
Judicial Conference of the United States authorized the creation of a "National
Federal-State Judicial Council " 73 to enable consideration of issues of mutual
concern. In 1992, the first national conference of state and federal judges
demonstrated the interest in increased coordination.74 In the fall of 1994, the
National Center for State Courts hosted a conference for federal and state
judges, lawyers, and academics to discuss joint work related to mass torts.75
A national newsletter now reports on the increasingly routine interactions of
state and federal court systems.
76
Note that all of these institutional changes have taken place in the 1990s.
At some level, it is startling that, for the two centuries prior to this decade,
state and federal judges did not meet regularly to discuss shared problems and
had no institutional organizations that they shared. That separation is steeped
in history, legal rules, and tradition. The current interaction is responsive to
problems that are neither anchored in bounded territories such as states or
72. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Western Regional Conference on State-Federal Judicial
Relationships, 155 F.R.D. 233,273-74(1993) (then Chief Judge Barbara Rothstein, of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington, discussing state-federal coordination) [hereinafter
Western Regional Conference]; Vincent L. McKusick, Combining Resources, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19,
1990, at 13 (former president of Conference of Chief Justices of State Courts arguing for coordination
in context of drug cases). Over the course of this year, consideration has been given to the creation of
uniform ethical rules, in part to respond to differing obligations imposed by some state laws (often
incorporated into federal local ethics rules) and by directives from the Department of Justice.
Negotiations between the Conference of Chief Justices of the State Courts and the Department are now
underway. For discussion of the conflicts, see Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics
and Erie, 9 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 89 (1995).
73. Harry W. Swegle, Washington Perspective, STATE COURT J., Fall 1990, at 2 ("It took 200
years to get around to it, but state and federal judges soon will begin talking to one another at the
national level on a formally structured and continuing basis.").
74. Malcolm M. Lucas, Keynote Address: National Conference on State-Federal Judicial
Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1992) (introducing conference); Edward B. McConnell, Planning
for the State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1849 (1992) (describing mechanisms for coordinated
work, federal judicial committees on which state judges serve, and conferences that had occurred); see
also Western Regional Conference, supra note 72, at 237 (Reporter John B. Oakley's preface describes
regional conference as implementing "principles" of 1992 meeting); William K. Slate, Proceedings of
the Middle Atlantic State-Federal Judicial Relationships Conference, 162 F.R.D. 173 (1994) (describing
that gathering, also stemming from the 1992 meeting) [hereinafter Middle Atlantic Conference]; Victor
Eugene Flango & Maria Schmidt, Administrative Cooperation between State and Federal Courts,
JUDGES' J., Spring 1995, at 3 (summarizing survey of judge and court administrators about their views
on areas for cooperation).
75. National Mass Tort Conference Held in Cincinnati, STATE JUSTICE INST. NEWS, Winter 1995,
at 1, 8 (describing National Mass Torts Conference, held Nov. 10-13, 1994, in Cincinnati, Ohio). The
papers presented at that conference are published in the Symposium, National Mass Tort Conference,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1523 (1995).
76. Orlando Meeting Fosters Interest in Judicial Federalism; New State-Federal Councils,
Conferences Are Planned, STATE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER 1 (jOint publication of the Federal
Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts, first issue, Jan. 1993).
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federal districts nor respectful of these legal categories. Global trading, national
and transnational companies, national law firms, the Internet, a population of
which 17 percent move annually' and of which some 40 percent do not live
in the state of their birth7 -- none of these are easily categorized as belonging
either singularly to one state or exclusively to the national government. 9
The consequences of judicial federalism are beginning to be visible-in the
press, law reviews, and occasionally in the case law. Despite the formal
statements of statutes and doctrine (that federal and state judicial systems are
distinct and there are no mechanisms for inter-jurisdictional consolidation'),
informally, federal and state judges are increasingly co-venturers working with
each other."1 For example, federal and state judges in charge of "All
Brooklyn Navy Yard" asbestos cases literally sat in the same room, jointly
convening a "state and federal court" and ruling together on issues.' In the
Exxon Valdez litigation, federal and state judges coordinated scheduling both
the pretrial and trial processes.83 The state-created Mass Tort Litigation
77. Peterson, supra note 18, at 113. According to a 1992 Census Bureau Press Release, the trend
in mobility has been downward in the last four decades, declining from 20 percent in the 1950s and.
1960s to 18 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. Americans in 1990-91 Moved at Lowest Rate Since Early
1980s, Census Bureau Says (Press Release, Nov. 17, 1992, CB92-180). The downward trend has
continued in the last few years; as of 1994, the rate was 16.7 percent. People Not Moving as Much as
They Did in the Mid-80s, Census Bureau Reports (Press Release, Sept. 12, 1995, CB95-162).
78. Gordon, supra note 7, at210 (arguing that, because between 1985-90, 21 million people within
the United States migrated between states, and as of 1990, some 60 percent lived in their state of birth,
state geographical boundaries and shared cultures are not synonymous).
79. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996) (holding that
despite exclusive jurisdictional authority of federal courts over securities claims, state court class action
settlement can preclude federal litigation).
80. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). The Anti-Injunction Act was relied on in part to preclude
formal state-federal consolidation in In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). The problems of coordination thereafter and the interrelationships between
the state and federal proceedings are described in a symposium, Civil Litigation in Mass Disasters: The
Hyatt Skywalks Collapse, 52 UMKC L. REV. 141 (1984).
81. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss & Alan Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in
Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992); see also
John B. Oakley, The Future Relationship of California's State and Federal Courts: An Essay on
Jurisdictional Reform, the Transformation of Property, and the New Age of Information, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 2233 (1993) (calling in short term for coordination and in longer term for unification).
82. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Districts Asbestos Litig., In re New York City Asbestos
Litigation, 737 F. Supp. 735 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct. N.Y., 1990) (denying motion to disqualify
special master appointed for those cases); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., In re Joint E. & S.
Districts Asbestos Lit., 123 B.R. 7 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct. N.Y., 1990) (requiring report on use
of funds); In re Joint E. & S. Districts Asbestos Litig., In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 129
F.R.D. 434 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct. N.Y., 1990) (appointing special master/referee). All of these
cases involve the joint work of Judge Helen E. Freedman of the New York State's Supreme Court and
Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The
captions vary, with state and federal cases "taking turns" as the lead.
83. See The Hon. H. Russel Holland, The Exxon Valdez: Was There a Second Disaster? 1, 8-12
(Presentation at the National Mass Tort Conference, Cincinnati, Ohio, Nov. 10, 1994) (on file with the
author) (detailing the state and federal judicial efforts to coordinate discovery and case preparation); see
also Notice of Related Case, a recommendation of the California State-Federal Council, in which
counsel would be obliged to inform judges of related cases pending in either state or federal courts
(Sept, 1994) (on file with the author).
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Committee (MTLC), comprised of judges from each of several states that have
many mass tort cases, worked in conjunction with the federal district judge
assigned the multi-district breast implant litigation to coordinate efforts."
More recently, federal and state judges in New York have referred breast
implant cases to a shared panel of experts.'
In addition to such individual inventions, proposals have been made to
change the formal prohibition on inter-jurisdictional transfers and consolida-
tions. In 1991, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Law
approved the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, designed to enable "transfer
of litigation from a court in one judicial system to a court in another judicial
system."' In 1994, the American Law Institute approved a proposal for
complex litigation that included provisions for consolidation in state courts of
litigation across state and federal lines.8 7
The civil docket is not the only example of state-federal coordination. The
idea of sharing resources and crossing boundaries is longstanding on the
criminal side, in which "cross-designation" of federal and state agents and
prosecutors makes permeable the lines between state and federal law
enforcement.88 In addition, federal prosecutors also cross federal district lines;
84. Details of a proposed and now defunct settlement can be found in In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp) (MDL 926), No. CV94-P-1 1558-S, 1994
WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994), and in Henry Weinstein, $3.7-Billion Breast Implant Settlement
Wins Tentative OK, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1994, at A3; Federal District Judge Sam Pointer appointed
the Hon. Ann T. Cochran, who subsequently resigned from the Texas state court judicial system, to
serve as claims administrator of the settlement fund. Some of the duties of the administrator are
described in In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant, 1994 WL 578353 at *10, *14, *25; see also Sandra
Mazer Moss, State-Federal and Interstate Cooperation, Case Management Techniques Move Complex
Litigation, Hasten Disposition of Asbestos, Other Cases, STATE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER, Apr.
1993, at 3; Middle Atlantic Conference, supra note 74, at 202-11 (detailing coordination among state
and federal judges in that and other mass torts).
85. See In re New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, Ind. No. 500,000193, Sup. Ct.
N.Y. City and In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation (E.D.N.Y. 96-BI-1 &
S.D.N.Y. 91-CV-6996 et al.), Order of Apr. 3, 1996 (appointing Margaret Berger to panel of experts);
Richard B. Schmitt, Judge to Pick Panel of Experts to Study Silicone Breast Implants, WALL ST. J.,
June 3, 1996, at B6.
86. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORhM TRANSFER
OF LITIGATION ACT (1992) (prefatory note) (approved by the National Conference, Aug. 1991 and
approved by the American Bar Association, Feb. 1992), reprinted in AMERICAN LAW INST., COMPLEX
LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS WITH REPORTER'S STUDY at 551 (App.
C) (1994) [hereinafter ALI, COMPLEX LITIGATION].
87. ALI, COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 86, at 201-16. For distinctions between the two, see
Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the AL[ Project with the Uniform
Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REV. 897 (1994).
88. In 1870, Congress gave the Attorney General of the United States the authority to appoint
special attorneys to assist in the "trial of any case." Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162, 164
(now codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) and § 518(b)). Since then, Congress has provided
additional authority for cross-designation under specific statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 5776a(e)
(West 1995) (child abduction cases). Parallel statutes exist in many states. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-1-201(1)(c) (West 1995) (authorizing appointment of special prosecutorial deputies, including
United States attorneys and their assistants); see also J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal-Tribal
Court Cooperation, 79 JUDICATURE 150, 153 (1995) (discussing designation by federal authorities in
Arizona and Oregon of tribal prosecutors as special assistant United States Attorneys).
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the "Unabomber" case is to be presented by a group of government lawyers
"designated as special attorneys in at least a handful of jurisdictions, including
Montana . . . Sacramento and New Jersey."89 These practices of joint and
cross designations might well be understood as "prosecutorial federalism" and
are a key element of government law enforcement.'
The physical boundaries of state and federal courts (even with the "100
mile bulge" 91) have so often been inscribed that it is hard to see that the lines
Courts have often affirmed prosecutorial authority to cross-designate, declined to require specificity
in the commissions of such designees, and welcomed the use of such coordinated activity of both
prosecutorial and investigatory officials of state and federal courts. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 221-22 (1960) (citing the need to foster cooperation between state and federal law
enforcement as a ground for adopting the exclusionary rule in federal courts); United States v. Ucciferri,
960 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1992) (reinstating a federal indictment based on investigation primarily
conducted by state authorities).
89. Mark Gladstone & Robert J. Ostrow, Sacramento Trial Likely in Unabomber Case, L.A.
TIMES, June 13, 1996, at A3.
90. See Dennis E. Curtis, The Effect of Federalization on the Defense Function, 543 ANNALS
AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85 (1996). The desirability of conceptualizing the state and federal
prosecutions as distinct rests in part on views toward allegedly criminal behavior, the meaning of the
due process and double jeopardy clauses, and the utility of multiple or overlapping prosecutions.
Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), discussing
whether the Illinois prosecution subsequent to an acquittal in federal district court for bank robbery was
proper.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (1963 amendments) (providing that those litigants "brought in as parties
pursuant to Rule 13(h) or Rule 14, or as additional parties to a pending action pursuant to Rule 19, may
be served ... at all places outside the state but within the United States that are not more than 100
miles from the place in which the action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred for
trial"). According to Wright and Miller, the 1963 amendments "recognize[d] the increased incidence
of multiparty litigation in the federal courts and the need to compromise territorial boundaries in order
to facilitate the handling of these cases." 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1127, at 332 (2d ed. 1987).
The import of the 1963 amendment providing the "bulge" has been differently described. Benjamin
Kaplan, then reporter for the Advisory Committee that drafted the rule, called the amendment "modest,"
analogized it to interpleader in that both enable federal judges to hear "entire controversies," and argued
both its constitutionality and propriety; Kaplan also noted that the rule responded to instances when
states could not constitutionally reach the "entire controversy." Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments to the
FederalRules of CivilProcedure, 1961-63 (1), 77 HARV. L. REv. 601, 629-34 (1964). In contrast, Allan
Vestal termed the change "monumental" because it represented a move from the "traditional limited
reach of the federal courts" and represented the "broad historical trend toward the supremacy of the
federal government." Allan D. Vestal, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach of the Federal Courts: The
1963 Changes in Federal Rule 4, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1053, 1053, 1077 (1963).
In 1993, the relevant provision was moved to FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B) and the language changed
somewhat (providing for service of parties joined under either Rules 14 or 19 and "served at a place
within a judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles from the place from which
the summons issues"). As the 1993 Advisory Note explained: "In the light of present-day facilities for
communication and travel, the territorial range of the service allowed, analogous to that which applies
to the service of a subpoena under Rule 45(e)(1), can hardly work hardship on the parties summoned"
and also noted that some "metropolitan areas spano] more than one state." The 1993 amendments also
provide for nationwide service of process in federal question cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(D).
FED. R. CIv. P. 45, which provides for service of subpoenas, has an analogous provision,
permitting such service "at any place without the district that is within 100 miles of the place of the
deposition, hearing, trial, production, or inspection." That federal courts could reach outside their own
territory has been a longstanding proposition of federal law; under a 1793 provision, a federal court
could subpoena witnesses not within the district but within "one hundred miles from the place of
holding" the hearing. See 1 Stat. 333, 335, ch. 22, § 6 (1793).
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are blurring. When federal and state judges sit together, when federal and state
prosecutors designate each other as their agents, they deconstruct the reality of
discrete and independent court systems. 2
III. FEDERALISM AND PHYSICALITY: THE CHANGING RELEVANCE OF
TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES
Thus far, many stories about "Our Federalism" 93 have emerged: that it
has longstanding features that reiterate themselves over the centuries,' that
it is the subject of invention and radical reformation or of evolution and
quiet alteration born of periodic reassessments, that it reflects a good deal of
consensus,' that it has little current substantive content and is really about
managing a large country,' and that it is soon to be eclipsed by international
activity.
98
One might tell a story that the states have disappeared in the sense that they
no longer exist as vital centers of power and governance, but that commenta-
tors are so accustomed to assuming states' presence that their demise cannot be
perceived. Alternatively, one might suggest that states have remarkable vitality
and stamina, given their endurance in the face of determined efforts at
nationalization. 99 One might argue for states' authority based on legal claims
92. Justice O'Connor has used the metaphor of a "marriage" to describe the state-federal
relationship, which she characterized as a system of "dialogue and dependence." Sandra Day O'Connor,
Keynote Speaker, MiddleAtlantic Conference, 162 F.R.D. 180, 182 (1994) ("Each partner must depend
on the other to uphold its solemn obligations with respect to federal rights; each partner must have
appropriate respect and regard for the other; and each partner must listen to and appreciate the views
the other brings to bear on the issues they must, by the necessity of their marriage, address in
common."). Whether that image conveys a blurring of boundaries (that I stress here) depends upon
one's concept of marriage.
93. While the phrase was used some forty times before, Justice Black was the first to put it in
quotes and capitalize it. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (that opinion was also the first
authored by him in which the phrase was used). For commentary on the claims of tradition made by that
decision, see Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1117-21 (1977).
94. Scheiber, supra note 7, at 227-33.
95. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our UnconventionalFounding, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 475,569
(1995) (calling for conception of Founders as "pioneers of an ongoing tradition of revolutionary
reform"); Frankfurter & Landis, Compact Clause, supra note 32.
96. Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 67, 77 (developing "minimal model" of federal jurisdiction, based in part on "areas of
agreement [that] turn out to be surprisingly large").
97. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 37 (arguing that Supreme Court doctrinal claims for federalism are
in fact arguments about decentralization of decisionmaking, that little evidence supports claim that
federalism diffuses power or that it supports, engenders, or reflects communities of affinity).
98. Friedman, supra note 43, at 1472 (predicting that globalization will further erode state
authority); Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1623, 164455 (1994) ("globalization of the economy is surely more important in determining what
happens in the lives of residents of the United States than the intricacies of federalism doctrine").
99. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns:Indian Tribes, States, andthe Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 671,747-58 (1989) (maintaining that vitality of federal Indian tribes and of some forms of state
governance suggest possibility of federalism continuing to enable divergent norm development and
authority); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 39, at 1357-61 (disputing conventional view that
centralization is inexorable force and calling for mechanism to maintain "robust federalism," in which
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to their formal status as political units recognized in the Constitution,1" or
because of the ubiquity of the drive toward devolution. 101 One might make
claims for state governance based on their capacities as "laboratories"
generative of new rights or of educational and participatory opportunities," 2
as enablers of affiliations to governments born from proximity, 3 as useful
or limited competitors," as autonomous centers of governance that provide
at least some choice of if not a vast diversity of rules,105 or as co-conversa-
tionalists in norm development."e6 One might argue instead for duality itself,
based on the view that two governments protect individual liberty more than
does one."0 7 Alternatively, one might perceive the state courts as "wrongdo-
ers" often in need of federal superintendence. 10
With the exception of the commentators who claim that states are
functionally defunct, most versions of federalism do not focus on the declining
saliency of physical domain or on the need to reconceptualize United States
legal federalism in light of coordinated actions among its participants. In the
context of the courts (and probably in other institutions of government as well),
the plausibility of bounded state and federal governance is declining, as is the
state boundaries have political content); Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207,
1208-09 (1994) (arguing that while Supreme Court's deference to state interests could be understood as
"little more than a strategy to exploit the state courts, conscripting them to a national agenda,"
federalism should be "untamed," so that state courts can have important "normative role ... in the
discourse concerning the meaning of rights").
100. Briffault, supra note 59, at 1344. Briffault maintains that most of the arguments made on
behalf of federalism's utility are arguments about the advantages of local governance and that such
localism does not depend on the existence of states but could be provided instead by municipalities.
101. See generally Schuck,. supra note 27.
102. Amar, Five Views, supra note 59, at 1233-36, 1240-46. Amar distinguishes between two views
of federalism, one that posits the states as laboratories for experimentation in an empirical sense and for
education and citizen participation, and a second-related-claim that states serve to safeguard rights
and to provide additional protection for citizens. This second view is tied to both the writings of Herbert
Wechsler and to Justice William Brennan, while Justices Frankfurter and O'Connor are associated with
the first. See also Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
afterGarcia, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 341,380-88 (articulating conception of states as tools to guard against
national tyranny).
103. GRODZINS, supra note 34, at 383-84. Grodzins also distinguishes this claim from one based
on participation in government, in part by noting low voting rates in local elections. Id. at 198.
104. Amar, Five Views, supra note 59, at 1236-40 (discussing both horizontal and vertical
competition, among states and against federal government); Lucian Ayre Bebehuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435,
1437-42 (1992) (arguing for "substantial expansion of the role of federal law" because of failures in
state competition in certain areas).
105. Merritt, supra note 59, at 1573-75 (suggesting that state autonomy serves as check on federal
government powers, diversifies participants in government, and offers some programmatic alternatives).
106. Various formulations on redundancy and duplication as virtues and inefficiencies are provided
in ELAzAR, supra note 36, at 30-32; Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Robert M. Cover, The Uses of
Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981)
[hereinafter Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy].
107. Amar, Five Views, supra note 59, at 1248. But see Briffault, supra note 59, at 1323
(questioning bases from which to assume that such duality of governance creates more freedom).
108. LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL CouRTs 44 (1994).
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explanatory power of the physical boundaries to justify courts' exercises of
jurisdiction."°9 As I have described above, participants within-judges,
lawyers, legislators, businesses, and residents-are chafing against such
boundaries." 0
The doctrine is ambivalent, and the data are mixed. Some fifty years ago,
the Supreme Court uncoupled the link between the authority of a court to
exercise jurisdiction over a person and that person's physical presence within
that court's territorial jurisdiction."' Until about 1950, a literal physical
nexus to the person (sometimes in the fictive form that the person had
designated a state official to act as that person's "agent" to receive process
within the boundaries of the state) was the sine qua non of jurisdictional power.
A government within the United States could not, absent consent, invoke its
power over a person without this material, embodied relationship. The distance
from that conception is marked by a 1996 proposed amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to permit the taking of testimony "in open court" by
"contemporaneous transmission from a different location."" 2
109. The decline of territory as a meaningful source of shared history poses problems not only for
legal jurisdictional theory but also for the nation-state. As Guehenno puts it: "The territorial foundation
of political modernity, as we have thought of it for centuries, is under attack today from new forms of
economic modernity. 'Territory' (spatial proximity) is of dwindling importance, now that not only
agriculture but industry, too, represents a decreasing part of economic activity." GUEHENNO, supra note
64, at 7-8.
110. I question not the longevity of state boundaries but their normative implications. Hence, I part
company with Briffault who argues that even "the modem tendency to define rights nationally, high
levels of interstate mobility, the emergence of new-non-state-based interests" will not undermine the
centrality of states, and relying in part on the "territorial integrity" of states, that very few boundary
changes have occurred. Briffault, supra note 59, at 1346, 1336-38. That states have fixed boundaries
does not make such boundaries determinative of how judicial systems should operate. Furthermore, as
Kramer explains, supra note 36, at 1522-46, key contemporary elements of state power stem from the
role of national media in an em of weak national political parties, the relationships among national and
state-elected officials, and federal laws relying on states for administrative purposes. See also Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and
Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587, 1591-97 (1994) (discussing how even "local" problems such as
noise and waste disposal can be inefficiently and inefficaciously decentralized).
111. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The facts of both cases reflect economic changes, dependent on
development of means of transportation and of commercial exchanges flowing easily interstate. In
Mullane, the issue was the ability of New York banks both to pool investors' accounts and to settle them
in group-wide proceedings; the Supreme Court authorized the state court to exercise jurisdiction over
non-residents whose funds were at issue. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311-13 (refusing to adopt then-
current jurisdictional characterizations of actions "in rem" or "in personam" but insisting instead on
jurisdictional authority of New York court over absentees-as long as the representative had notice and
absentees were also noticed). In International Shoe, the State of Washington wanted to impose its
unemployment tax on a St. Louis, Missouri corporation that did business in Washington by means of
sales representatives and sample merchandise (including a single shoe out of a pair); the Court upheld
jurisdiction by relying on the defendant's systemic and ongoing relationships with the state. See 326
U.S. at 313, 318-20.
112. FED. R. Ctv. PRo. 43(a), 64 USLW 4277 (Apr. 30, 1996) (to become effective Dec. 1, 1996,
absent contrary congressional action). The permission for such testimony is limited, requiring a court's
decision "for good cause shown in compelling circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards." The
Advisory Committee Note however states that "[glood cause and compelling circumstances may be
established with relative ease if all parties agree .... " Id.
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But despite that move in the 1950s away from physicality to a "relational"
theory of jurisdictional power over people in civil litigation, territoriality
remains a vital part of contemporary jurisdictional law. In 1990, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that, when a person is served within the
boundaries of a state, jurisdictional authority is proper, no matter the
relationship between that person and the state.113 Federal admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction are similarly connected to place.114 Forum-selection
clauses are generally enforceable."' Further, on the criminal side, physical
presence remains the touchstone; the absent defendant cannot generally be
tried.1 6 And the related point is that physical authority alone can permit trial;
not only does the ability to compel extradition serve the requirement of
physical presence but jurisdiction by kidnap is also permitted under Supreme
Court constitutional interpretation." 7
113. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). It is not happenstance that Justice Scalia,
a consistent member of the majorities that have struck Congressional statutes over states for violating
federalism's boundaries is also the author of Burnham. See generally The Future of Personal
Jurisdiction:A Symposium on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 559-699 (1991), including
Lea Brilmayer, Introduction: Three Perennial Themes of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS
L.J. 561, 561-64 (discussing "borders versus distance"); Linda Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v.
Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 569 (discussing role of historical practices and expressing concern about nationwide
service of process because of the relationship between choice of law and jurisdiction rules).
114. Location is not the exclusive basis but a factor to be considered. See City of Chicago v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1048 (1995) (Souter, J., for the majority) (determining
that admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(1) involving tort claims "must satisfy conditions both
of location and of connection with maritime activity"); compare the opinion by Justice Thomas, joined
by Justice Scalia, arguing that the jurisdictional inquiry should be limited to the "simple question
whether the tort occurred on a vessel on the navigable waters." Id. at 1056; see also Executive Jet
Aviation Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) (concerning plane that falls into Lake Erie not
within admiralty jurisdiction because "wrong" did not "bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity").
The reach of federal civil law beyond the United States and its relationship to international or
transnational laws of human rights is discussed in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
pending sub nom. Karadzic v. Kadic, No. 95-1599.
115. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Such clauses suggest both the relevance
of place and the potential burdens that distance can impose. Whether telecommunications can cushion
such costs depends in part on the respective resources of the litigants. See generally EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., LrIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992).
116. Linked to the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause and right to defend guarantees as well
as to due process concerns, Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a non-
corporate felony defendant be present at arraignment and at every stage of the proceedings, subject to
waiver. See Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748 (1993) (absconding prior to the beginning of trial
precludes trial under the Rule). If a defendant absconds during trial, it may continue, and if a defendant
leaves the country while an appeal is pending, an appellate court may dismiss that appeal. Ortega-
Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993). The "fugitive disentitlement doctrine," however,
has its limits; a criminal defendant's absence cannot be used to dismiss that defendant's civil suit
challenging forfeiture of property. See Degen v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1777 (1996). In short, the
need in criminal law for the body of the defendant is not matched on the civil side.
117. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (abduction of criminal defendant,
even from countries with which the United States has extradition treaties, does not prevent that
defendant's trial). The court in Alvarez-Machain relied on what has become termed the "Ker-Frisbie"
doctrine. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (State of llinois had defendant abducted from Peru);
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Moreover, while I provided above some information about large scale
aggregates with their multitude of far-flung parties, a good deal of litigation in
the United States remains bipolar, and according to Professors Kevin Clermont
and Theodore Eisenberg, the place at which disputes are resolved has a
surprisingly large effect on the outcome. In their study of almost three million
federal cases terminated between fiscal years 1979 and 1991, they found that
when a motion for transfer was granted and a plaintiff's choice of venue was
trumped by a judge (typically responding to a defendant's motion), the overall
rate of plaintiff victories dropped from about 58 percent to just under 30
percent."' Moreover, despite assumptions of United States courts' inhospital-
ity to "foreigners" (here defined as non-United States litigants), Clermont and
Eisenberg found that foreign plaintiffs and defendants have higher success rates
than do domestic litigants and that out of state litigants also do better than
"locals."
119
In short, territoriality and physicality-material connections in water, air,
and land-are centerpieces of jurisdictional authority, theory, and practice.1"
To this day, active federal judges are generally required to reside within the
circuit or district in which they sit,"' and federal district lines are drawn in
relationship to state boundaries. But we who think about courts will need to
reassess assumptions-both of structure and of process-heretofore deeply
rooted in the physical relationship of human beings on a specific piece of soil
and a particular courthouse.
At the outset, I mentioned a consent decree that bound litigants in
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (Michigan officials kidnapping defendant from Chicago).
118. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 1507, 1512 (1995). They note that motions to transfer, while affecting a small
percentage of the federal docket, are rising slowly. Id. at 1526-27. That trend may reflect a growing
number of litigants being sued at distances from their preferred forum.
119. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARv. L.
REV. 1120, 1136, 1142 (1996). Theirexplanation is of greater selectivity by non-local litigants, resulting
in their selective pursuit of meritorious or stronger cases.
120. See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL AcTS 54 (1989) ("government coercion
is mediated by reference to land"); see also Friedman, supra note 43, at 1442-53 (predicting that
globalization will require reconsidering domestic federalism, including the forms of regulating business
and industry).
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (1994) (except for the D.C. Circuit, each circuit judge "shall be a
resident of the circuit for which appointed at the time of his appointment and thereafter while in active
service"); 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1994) (except again for the District of Columbia, each district judge
"shall reside in the district... for which he is appointed"). These provisions stem from the First
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73. Once holding a life-tenured judgeship, that individual
may be temporarily reassigned to sit elsewhere. 28 U.S.C. §§ 291 (circuit judges), 292 (district judges)
(1994). While some senior judges have moved under those provisions, they are not yet used freely to
alter the idea of landlocked judges; for example, when one recently elevated federal appellate judge
requested permission to change his residency from New Jersey to California and to telecommute, that
request was rejected. See David Stout, Judge Barred from Moving his Chambers to Calfornia, N.Y.
TuES, Apr. 25, 1996, at B6; Neil MacFarquhar, Federal Judge to Resign, Citing Political Attacks,
N.Y. TmEs, June 5, 1996, at B4.
Constructing a New Federalism
Tennessee, Alabama, and California." Above I detailed practices in which
judges either merged jurisdictions or coordinated proceedings across jurisdic-
tional lines." In this symposium, Senator Joseph Biden described his
experience as a child growing up in Delaware but greeted by airborne soot
from plants in Pennsylvania.124 Discussing federalism in the context of health
care debates, Professor Grogan noted that it was not clear how state autonomy
was advanced when states contract for the provision of care to only a few
national health care providers, nor why one would characterize that activity as
"state"-based.'" Professor Swire analyzed what is known (evocatively) as
"not in my back yard" (NIMBY), 12 but the issue is what constitutes one's
"back yard." Take the dispute about expansion of airports in the Chicago
area;127 the municipalities around both O'Hare and Midway Airports debate
those airports' expansion. At one level (literally, that of the neighboring houses
and streets), the issue is well understood as "local." But it also affects all who
commute across country as well as the shipment of goods and parcels.
This problem of how to site an issue, be it jurisdictional or substantive, is
reflected in choice of law doctrine. Choice of law is an area of law in which,
like jurisdiction, reliance on a physical nexus-the place of the event-solves
fewer problems when participants in the event(s) are disbursed throughout a
range of venues and injuries occur across not only physical boundaries but also
through electronic transmissions. Take a major pronouncement in the 1980s in
the field of choice of law, Allstate v. Hague." The Supreme Court had little
instructive to say when faced with a question about the constitutionality of the
application of Minnesota law (which required the "stacking" of coverage
clauses in auto policies protecting against uninsured drivers) to insurance
policies issued (aptly) by "Allstate" to a resident of Wisconsin who drove daily
to work in Minnesota. Allstate argued for the application of Wisconsin's law
(which would have required it to pay the $15,000 for uninsured motorist
coverage once, rather than stacking the three policies and requiring payment
of $45,000). The Court only issued the reminder that states that lack any
contact with a dispute cannot impose their laws. 129 Relying on longstanding
122. See supra note 15.
123. See supra Part II.
124. Sen. Joseph Biden, Jr., Keynote Address delivered at Yale Law and Policy Review/Yale
Journal on Regulation, Symposium: Uonstructing a New Federalism (Mar. 1-2, 1996).
125. Grogan, supra note 11, at 358. Similar questions are raised about other commentators'
discussions of problems of a "locality," see, e.g., Butler & Macey, supra note 3, at 43, and when, in
the interaction between a multistate corporation and a piece of land, the characterization "local" should
attach.
126. Swire, supra note 3, at 105 (discussing "classic" NIMBY as occurring when "neighbors are
geographically close to each other and easy to identify").
127. See Isabel Wilkerson, Airport Battle Grows in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1991, at A10.
128. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
129. 449 U.S. at 312-13 ("for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
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conceptions, the Court assigned the plaintiff a single place of residence
(Wisconsin) and then asked a series of questions about the "contacts" between
the plaintiff, the defendant, the cause of action, and the State of Minnesota.
Yet, as Justice Brennan explained for the Court, Minnesota was specially
situated in the life of the plaintiff; it was a "very important contact" to be a
"member of Minnesota's work force. "130
The economically-inclined among us might consider this example as
raising problems for Allstate about how to price insurance across the country,
whether varying state rules on stacking of insurance policies represented
competition for business or other interests, and whether states that had or had
not adopted such rules imposed "externalities" on other states. Implicit in both
the doctrinal and economic approach are the assumptions that physical
boundaries are salient and that each participant is assigned a single residence
for which one posits either "contacts" to other sites (in doctrinal terms) or
"internalizing" or "externalizing" the costs (in economic terms).
But why not use this example to question the reliance on boundaries, the
conception of a singular relationship between individuals and states, and the
assumption that the competitors in the "race" are individual states? If a person
works in one state and sleeps in another, it is not fully coherent to imbue one
state with the significance of "residence" and the other as having a "contact"
but not a "relationship" to that individual. (Depending on one's line of work,
one may spend more waking hours where one works than where one "lives").
I do not know the number of persons who have a driver's license from one
state, vote in another, and own land in a third; the Census Bureau tells us that,
as of 1990, about 4 million worked in a state other than their residence.
13'
To use Peter Schuck's example, given that a person can "enjoy many of the
economic and cultural advantages of New York while living in South
Dakota, "132 it is not clear what legal meaning to attach to the fact that one
is sleeping in South Dakota. Moreover, to return to the Clermont and
Eisenberg data, to find that the geographic identities of parties or the places of
litigation affect outcomes in the federal courts undermines the theory of federal
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair"). The
Court held that the contacts here with Minnesota sufficed for its law to be applied.
130. 449 U.S. at 313-314. Hinting at the need to shift rules, Justice Brennan also discussed how
states have "police power responsibilities toward the nonresident employee that are analogous, if
somewhat less profound, than toward residents" and described Mr. Hague as "a longstanding member
of Minnesota's work force." Id. at 314, 318.
131. 1990 Census of Population: Journey to Work and Migration Statistics Branch; Population
Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, STF3C. (that 4 million represents 3.5 percent of workers over
the age of 16; in 1980, 3.1 percent of such persons worked outside their state of residence). [expand]
132. Schuck, supra note 27, at 18. Schuck then proceeds to analyze the idea of the population
"distribut[ing] itself among communities according to its differing preferences concerning the mix of
taxes and services offered by those communities." Id. I think, rather, that some segments of the
population should be understood as living simultaneously in more than one community.
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courts as neutral fora per se and raises the question of whether venue ought to
influence adjudicative decisions.'
As the placement of people and businesses tells us less and less, doctrine,
legal rules, and economic theories will need to shift. 4 Whatever the
headaches of how to count people for purposes of the census created by such
changing conceptions of the United States,135 people, like corporations, will
need to be understood as participating as residents and citizens of different
types in several states and be accorded a range of legal statuses to reflect
degrees of relatedness.
1 31
From a history in which courts were not licensed to commence their
proceedings without the body of the defendant to the demise of the fictive
appointment of an agent for service of process, from requirements of lawyers'
"appearances" to permission to file by fax, courts are slowly moving away
from physical presence. Today it is telephone conferences in lieu of court
appearances. 37 Tomorrow it will be video teleconferencing and the internet.
Today, claimants and lawyers from across the country in the Silicone Breast
Implant Litigation can address questions to the claims facility in Texas and
receive information about the litigation via a computer, 13 and LEXIS-NEXIS
has developed a "complex litigation automated docket system" (CLAD) by
which documents can be filed electronically and decisions posted. 3 9 Given
cyberspace" and globalization, the coherence of physicality as the basis of
133. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection
Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 425 (1992) (arguing that geography is
"arbitrary, extraneous, and distorting factor" whose effects on "the fair and orderly administration of
the laws" should be limited).
134. My e-mail recently informed me that a "Virtual Magistrate" had been established for the
Internet as a part of a "Voluntary Dispute Resolution for Network Conflicts," a project, supported by
the National Center for Automated Information Research, to provide "neutral arbitrators" (trained in
law and in computer networks) to serve to respond to disputes that will "inevitably" arise. (Notice
posted April 11, 1996, my thanks to my colleague Matt Spitzer for forwarding it to me).
135. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. City of New York, 116 S. Ct. 1091 (1996) (rejecting challenge to
methodology of 1990 Census).
136. Jurisdictional rules on corporations may be instructive. Corporations have two "citizenships"
for purposes of diversity, that of their place of incorporation and that of their principle place of business,
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c)(1) (1993); under rules that required service of process on agents within the state,
corporations were deemed by the act of doing business to have appointed the Secretary of State as such
an agent.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (providing for pretrial conferences in person or "by... telephone,
mail, or other suitable means").
138. The Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel created a Breast Implant Bulletin Board System, enabling
access by modem to obtain information, including finding posted notices about the progress of the
litigation and dates of hearings; in addition, the Claims Facility has also established a Bulletin Board
for claimants. Telephone interview with Richard Rosenthal, Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel (July 6, 1995).
139. Telephone interview with Richard Klein of LEXIS-NEXIS (June 14,1995) (describing systems
used by Delaware Superior Court for its asbestos litigation and in multi-party insurance case; as well
as by Fulton County Court System, Georgia; Southern District of New York's Bankruptcy Court in
bankruptcy proceeding; and in Eastern District of Ohio for product liability action).
140. The nonphysicality and intangibility of cyberspace was of central import to the recent finding
of the unconstitutionality of regulations aimed at curbing "indecent" speech on the internet. See ACLU
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jurisdiction diminishes, with variation depending on the context.' 4'
IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF INCORPORATING PRESENT ALTERATIONS, THE
ATrRAcTIONS OF "TRADITIONS," AND THEIR LIMITS
So often have traditions been rehearsed-of discrete and territorially-
bounded roles for the state and federal system, of a three-tiered federal
pyramid (constructed, by the way, only a hundred years ago)," of only life-
tenured federal judges, of bipolar litigation, of trials as central-that descrip-
tions persist despite changing realities. What accounts for the distance between
description and practice? Using claims about past jurisdictional lines or
longstanding descriptions of federal courts as the basic assumptions of
current parameters appears to offer both security and presumptions of
legitimacy-so appealing in a world patently insecure and filled with exercises
of power lacking in constraint. Moreover, invocation of historical practices as
a basis for contemporary decision making is not without its attractions-as a
means of attempting to draw principles from practice and to avoid imposition
v. Reno, 1996 WL 311865 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1996). Each of the three judges writing as a part of the
three judge court stressed the unique character of the medium; Judge Dalzell described it as providing
"a never-ending worldwide conversation." Id. at *64.
141. As Lawrence Friedman so nicely put it: "Borders are no longer as significant as they once
were. From the economic standpoint at least, they are hardly impenetrable frontiers, but rather flimsy
and insubstantial curtains of gauze, through which goods, ideas, and people flow rather easily."
Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of TransnationalLaw, 32 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 65, 90 (1996).
142. The original structure of 1789 provided that Supreme Court justices joined district judges in
sitting as appellate courts; no right of appeal attached in all instances. The creation of a separate
intermediate appellate court between trial courts and the Supreme Court and of a right of appellate
review occurred by a series of enactments from 1891 to 1925. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891 (Evarts Act),
ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (establishing circuit courts of appeal and appointing additional circuit judges but
continuing the nisi prius jurisdiction of those courts); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087
(abolishing circuit courts and transferring their jurisdiction to the district courts); Act of Feb. 13, 1925,
ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (Judges Bill) (requiring the use of intermediate appellate judges and establishing
generally discretionary review at the Supreme Court level). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES
M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT, A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 103-
45 (1928).
143. Much of the contemporary commentary about the federal courts falls within the tradition of
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler, who wrote the landmark text in 1953. See HENRY M. HART, JR. &
HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1st ed. 1953). Several
editions have been issued, but not until the last few years have questions emerged about its basic
structure. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 953 (1994) (analyzing elements of approach, including its focus on appropriate allocations of
power and institutional responsibilities); Richard H. FallonJr., Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms,"
12 CONST. COMMENTARY 3, 3 (1995) (discussing Hart and Wechsler's approach as "reigning Federal
Courts 'paradigm'"); Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY
557 (1994-95) (arguing that approach is no longer generative and should be replaced); Judith Resnik,
Rereading "The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of
the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (1994) (arguing that reconception was required); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1989) (reviewing HENRY M. HART, JR.
& HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed.) and discussing its
influence and assumptions).
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of normative judgments not anchored in shared assumptions."'
Reliance on historical practices as guides to United States' legal federal-
ism's future is problematic, however, in part because the practices are
themselves varied and complex, and in part because some of the practices stem
from contexts now eclipsed by profound changes that structure daily lives.
Take again the example of the federal courts. As noted above, the Judicial
Conference of the United States argues for a presumption against expansion of
federal civil jurisdiction; the commentary attempts to link that policy preference
to longstanding allocations of state and federal court authority.145 But the
practices over the past two centuries are multifaceted and varied, and different
retellings of federal jurisdictional history can stress an array of its iterations,
permitting a range of normative claims to be couched in historical practices but
varying significantly.
For example, Richard Fallon argues that two competing conceptions of the
federal judicial role lie within United States Supreme Court doctrine. He terms
one a "nationalist model" and another a "federalist model," and then details
the claims made on behalf of both and the historically relevant moments to
which each turned. 146 For the federalists, the founding of the nation is key;
the states are the backdrop court system, and the federal courts are part of the
extra court system, to be employed only in the exceptional moment. 47 For
the nationalists, the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment, the New Deal, and
the 1960s Civil Rights movement revised the story and shifted the focus; the
stress is on federal courts' involvement.14 From these differing visions, one
could create two kinds of presumptions, one about presumptive reliance on
state courts and the other about a presumptive welcome to the federal courts.
Turning from such a jurisprudential overview to specific areas of law, the
criminal arena is currently of concern to many federal judges, who decry what
144. The reliance on history as a normative justification is not only attractive to nations; it is also
constitutive of them. As Guehenno describes, "A nation has no other definition but historical. It is a
locus ofa common history, ofcommon misfortunes, and of common triumphs." GuEHENNO, supra note
64, at 4. Arguing that territorial boundaries of nations are also central to their identities and that those
boundaries have little coherence given economic and technological changes, he then concludes that the
era of "nations" is coming to a close.
145. See supra note 8.
146. Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, supra note 59, at 1150-64.
147. Id. at 1151-57 (states as equally "competent" and absent contrary evidence, federal judges
should respect state court abilities).
148. Id. at 1158-64 (discussing "special role" for federal judiciary and ready access); see also Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (discussing states as wrongdoers in need
of federal oversight); YACKLE, supra note 108, at 34-44 (arguing that the federal courts are "far better
forums for the vindication of rights than are the state courts"); Robert Jerome Glennon, The
Jurisdictional Legacy ofthe Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 869 (1994) (providing historical
case study of events in southern parts of United States in 1950s and 1960s and arguing that jurisdictional




some have described as the "federalization" of criminal law.'49 But federal
criminal law has long been an eclectic and sweeping amalgam, overlapping
state jurisdiction in a variety of areas. As Professor Rory Little has summa-
rized it, by 1790 federal criminal jurisdiction reached bribery, false statements,
"murder, maiming, theft, fraud, and even receiving stolen property."15°
Scanning the last two centuries, Professor John Jefries and Judge John Gleeson
conclude that, even before the 1994 crime bill, "federal law reached virtually
all robberies, most schemes to defraud, many firearms offenses, all loanshark-
ing, most illegal gambling operations, most briberies, and every drug deal, no
matter how small .... 151
Similar examples can be found in other parts of the federal docket. During
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, land speculation and holding
were "national," "federal" issues of great import to the creation of a central
government. 1 2 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, labor-
management relations moved into national focus and onto the federal courts'
agenda." Kidnapping for ransom became a national concern in 1932 in the
wake of the abduction of a child of Charles Lindbergh. 154 The era of federal
149. See William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993
Wis. L. REV. 1, 6-7; see generally Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Roles of the Federal and
State Governments in the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASINGS L.J. 965 (1995).
150. Little, supra note 10, at 1063; see also id. at 1034 (arguing that it is mythic to perceive of the
"federalization of crime [as] a new phenomenon"); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:
Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. Cin. L. REv. 775, 833 (1994) (describing
congressional creation of federal crimes beyond the "explicit constitutional authority" and arguing that
the First Congress believed itself authorized to create federal criminal law "necessary and proper to the
exercise of some other explicit federal power") (footnote omitted). In contrast to Little, Professor
Kathleen F. Brickey argues that the "federalization of American criminal law is a twentieth century
phenomenon." Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of American CriminalLaw,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1135, 1137-41 (1995).
151. John C. Jeffries Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of
FederalProsecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1095-97 (1995) (footnotes omitted). For a snapshot a half
century earlier, see L.B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors'Discretion, 13 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 64 (1948) (discussing "[nlational criminal jurisdiction, [ranging from] treason
to hunting offenses, occupying approximately one quarter of the federal judges' time") (footnote
omitted).
152. John P. Frank, HistoricalBases ofthe Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
3, 22 (1948) (stating that there were twenty-five Supreme Court cases, many brought by virtue of
diversity jurisdiction, about "interests in public lands between 1790 and 1815"; the "Supreme Court
aided virtually every land speculator who came before it from 1790 to 1815") (footnote omitted). On
"congressional instrunentalism" when deciding the boundaries of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction in the early years, see WILLAM R. CASrO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLiC:
THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 52 (1995) ("Mhe drafters of the
Judiciary Act viewed the federal courts as a tool to effect specific substantive results.").
153. Ray Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 114 (1948).
154. Horace L. Bomar, Jr., The Lindbergh Law, 1 LAw & CONTEM. PROBs. 435, 435-36 (1934)
(stating that in 1931, while a survey of 501 chiefs of police found that 279 kidnappings occurred in
1931, only 69 convictions were reported; proposals for federal jurisdiction over inter-state kidnappings
had been made but none were enacted until after that "atrocious deed"). For discussion of both the
federalization of car theft in 1919 and the subsequent "de facto defederalization" by prosecutorial
decisions not to bring such cases, see Little, supra note 10, at 1068-69 (discussing how between 1922-
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prohibition of alcohol resulted in a federal prison population in the early 1940s
in which about half of the inmates were incarcerated for "liquor law
violations." 155 Also during the twentieth century, both the New Deal and the
1960s Civil Rights movement prompted Congress to define a myriad of issues,
some relating to economic wherewithal and some to civil liberties, as
"federal. "116 In the past few years, a battle has been fought about whether
violence against women is a national issue to which federal judicial attention
ought to be paid,157 and about the scope of federal court criminal jurisdic-
tion. '5 From these varying uses of the federal courts over the past two
centuries, Jamie Gorelick and Harry Litman object to the very effort of
identifying "fixed spheres of federal and state activity" and conclude that a
principle limiting federal court criminal jurisdiction "cannot be squared with
the historical development of the federal courts' jurisdiction. ""' 9
33, an average of 1,466 auto theft prosecutions were brought, but by 1991 such filings were less than
205 per year).
In the 1930s, bank robbery also first became a federal crime. See Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304,
48 Stat. 783. According to the Justice Department, impetus for the bill came from difficulties contending
with organized gangsters "sufficiently powerful and well equipped to defy local police, and to flee
beyond the borders of the State before adequate forces can be organized." See H.R. REP. No. 1461,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1933) (Statement of Attorney General); see also A Note on the Racketeering,
Bank Robbery, and "Kick-Back" Laws, 1 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 445, 448 (1934) ("Since only
federal forces are free to conduct their operations without regard for state lines, the federal government
is in a strategic position to combat such activities."). See Brickey, supra note 150, at 1144 (by
legislation such as this, local problems became national ones).
155. James V. Bennett, Excerpts from Report on Federal Youthfid Offenders, tbl. A, reprinted in
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMrTTEE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME 41, App. I
(1942). In terms of the focus of federal criminal enforcement during that era, see Schwartz, supra note
2, at 64 (stating that of 31,114 criminal cases instituted in 1947, 3244, or more than 10 percent, were
filed under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act; the two largest categories prosecuted were "fraud and
other theft" which represented 7082 cases or almost 23 percent, and immigration which represented
7029 cases, also about 23 percent).
156. Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, supra note 59, at 1158-64; see also Little,
supra note 10, at 1059 (discussing how what might be termed "ordinary" street crime is sometimes
perceived to have federal dimensions because of the relationship between those assaults and racial
hostility).
157. In 1994, Congress answered in the affirmative, enacting the Violence Against Women Act.
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West Supp. 1995)). For the four years during which the proposal was pending,
federal judicial voices and many lawyers voiced opposition. See Cahn, supra note 42, at 1108-11,
nn. 188-93 and accompanying text (1994) (reviewing exchanges among federal and state judges and
Senator Biden, one of the legislative sponsors). In 1993, the Judicial Conference of the United States
changed its position. It no longer opposed the legislation, but took no position on the creation of a new
cause of action and supported the provisions for studies of gender bias, also provided in the legislation.
See Judicial Conference Resolution on Violence Against Women (Mar. 1993), reprinted in REPORTS OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (June 14, 1993); see also
Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 24 THIRD BRANCH 1, 3 (1992)
(discussing Judicial Conference's then opposition to some portions of the bill that would "involve the
federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes").
158. Little, supra note 10, at 1034-70, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (dividing
5-4 on whether possession of gun "substantially affects interstate commerce").
159. Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Federalization Debate,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 969 (1995).
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That history is messy or multi-faceted does not require rejection of
historical practices per se but rather self-conscious work at exploring how and
why one selects a particular set of practices as exemplary. But other difficulties
also counsel skepticism about drawing sustaining guidance from traditional
practices in this particular context. A good deal of discussion of the jurisdic-
tional boundaries of the federal courts depends on the invocation of these
categories as if they had clear content, as if "state" as compared to "federal"
courts were sufficiently distinct that one could hold the two next to each other
and readily mark the differences."6°
But given the long history of concurrence of jurisdictional authority, state
and federal courts overlap and resemble each other in several dimensions,
including caseload, judiciaries, and modes of decisionmaking. The federal
docket is an eclectic mix, not limited only to disputes readily recognized as
"federal." 161 Much of federal jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the state
courts and has been since the inception of the country. While federal courts
have more life tenured judges than other judiciaries, federal courts are no
longer populated exclusively by life-tenured judges. 62 The modes of decision
making within federal courts are also not unique. The amalgam of manage-
ment, settlement, and adjudication, of published and unpublished decisions, is
shared by state and federal judiciaries. While federal jurisdictional boundaries
have been and are more limited than that of state courts, limited mandates
themselves do not delineate federal courts from other adjudicatory institutions;
federal agencies also function as courts of limited jurisdiction.
The one remaining distinguishing feature is that federal courts today are
richer, in material and symbolic terms, than their counterparts. This relative
richness comes in several forms, such as judicial salaries, the ratio of judges
to cases, the quality of courtroom space and its comfort, the public resources
160. As the final report of the Long Range plan put it, the "starting point in articulating a sound
judicial system is identifying the essentials of federal court jurisdiction." LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note
8, at 23 (emphasis added). In contrast, an analysis of federal criminal law, by considering convictions
and incarcerations by type of crime, concludes that while the federal and state case loads look different,
categories of federal criminal work are a "series of clusters of diverse case types," reflecting "federal
special interests," but that what "the special interest may be" does not appear from the data. "If there
is a general theory of federal criminal jurisdiction in the statistics on prosecution and imprisonment, it
is not visible to the naked eye." Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis
for Federal Criminal Legislation, 542 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 19-20 (1996).
161. One example is the exchange between Justice Scalia and Marc Galanter about the federal
docket. Justice Scalia argued that, in 1960 (when he had gone to law school), the docket of the federal
courts was populated by important cases, with a touch of the "routine." Address by Justice Antonin
Scalia to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Bar Presidents,
New Orleans, LA (Feb. 15, 1987), reprinted in 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 252 (1987). Galanter reviewed
the docket of those "good old days," and demonstrated that a good many "routine" cases were on the
docket then as now (but may well not have been the subject of law school discussions). Marc Galanter,
The Life and 77mes of the Big Six: Or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 921, 921-28.
162. See Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature andAllocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts,
24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990) (discussing valuation of tasks of different federal trial judges).
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spent, the status of the lawyers and litigants who appear in the courts, and the
status accorded to those who hold the position of federal judge. 163 But, as
some federal judges are quick to point out, these features of federal court may
also be vulnerable."M More poignantly, this mark of distinction rests on the
existence of other, less fortunate judiciaries.
That state and federal courts overlap to a large extent is not surprising
when one remembers that courts' dockets reflect the overlapping work of the
state and federal governments. As is illustrated by the debates among Supreme
Court justices about the meaning and reach of the Tenth Amendment, in which
discussion has focused on whether particular kinds of activities should be
understood as belonging to a state and beyond congressional legislative
authority,"65 a search for the "essential attributes" of a sovereignty is
unavailing.
The construction of roads and the provision of social welfare were once
deemed "private" activities, superintended by neither the state nor federal
governments," 6 while educational facilities were often supported by public
and private resources.167 Technological changes alter the relevance of
geographical boundaries, and with that, the role of territories's govern-
ment. 68 Social mobility makes the idea of family law as local law implausi-
ble; interstate support orders are of course needed for collection of debts, 69
163. See Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, supra note 60, at 249-54.
164. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 5-20.
165. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating Fair Labor
Standards Act's application to localities); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (overruling National League of Cities and upholding congressional authority to regulate wages
of transit workers of a locality); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that while
Congress can create incentives for states to share in problems of nuclear waste disposal, federal
government cannot compel states to accept nuclear waste).
166. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539-47. Justice Blackmun described the difficulty of
distinguishing "governmental" versus "proprietary" functions and rejected the possibility that a
"workable standard for 'traditional governmental functions'" could be developed; he also discussed the
limited utility of historical tests. The bases for this decision are illuminated by Tushnet, supra note 98,
at 1626-34 (explaining that Justice Blackmun had initially voted in conference in Garcia to overrule
Congress but that, upon attempting to draft that opinion for a then-majority, he became persuaded that
he could "'find no principled way'" to do so).
167. See NEWTON EDWARDS & HERMAN G. RICHEY, THE SCHOOL IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL
ORDER 211 (1963) (claiming that at Founding, "no one could have foreseen that education would come
to be regarded as one of the essential functions of government"; arguing that rise of interest in public
education was linked to concern about need for educated populace to enable republican institutions to
function); LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PuBuic SCHOOL, 1825-1925 (1987)
(arguing that history of public and private involvement demonstrates that states could subsidize non-
public secular educational institutions).
168. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1992), provides a good example; both
nuclear waste and its ready transport, as well as its extraterritorial risks, are artifacts of the twentieth
century. See also Merritt, supra note 59, at 1564-66 (discussing limitations of theory of federalism based
on territory).
169. See the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA) of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228, enacted in 1992, the
constitutionality of which is now being debated (post Lopez) in the lower courts. See, e.g., United States
v. Schroeder, 912 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding Act unconstitutional); United States v.
Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding Act).
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and many issues of family life intersect with current national laws on
bankruptcy, immigration, and benefits. 170 Mark Tushnet makes a further
point: that many government functions are not themselves performed by
governments but are contracted out to private entities.171 Morton Grodzins
fights the dichotomization itself and argues that the role of governance has long
been shared by federal, state, and local authorities, as well as by public and
private actors."r In short, while a good deal of this Symposium's discus-
sions are in the context of state or federal, public or private, centralization or
devolution, it is important to remember that some "ands" might be use-
ful-state and federal, public and private, centralized and state-run. 73 As
Felix Frankfurter (a complex speaker on federalism) and James Landis argued
seventy years ago, "[olur regions are realities. Political thinking must respond
to these realities.""174
Divergent claims are made about today's "realities." Edward Rubin and
Malcolm Feeley argue that the country has evolved from a federation of semi-
sovereigns into a national government that relies on the states as mechanisms
of decentralization; in their view, federalism per se has little to commend
it. 175 Professor Daniel Meador suggests a unified court system. 176 In con-
trast, Larry Kramer believes that the states are vital law makers, affecting the
lives of most citizens more than does the federal government." Two decades
ago, Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff spoke of the values of a
dialectical federalism, of the ongoing dialogue between state and federal
systems, of the normative utility of maintaining distinctive systems, and of the
170. Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender, supra note 42, at 1621-30 (describing "federal laws of
the family"); some federalist systems, including Canada and Australia, locate some family matters in
their national court systems. See P.E. Joske, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 203-04 (1967);
Martha A. Field, The Dffering Federalisms of Canada and the United States, 55 LAw & CONTEIP.
PROBS. 107, 108 (Winter 1992).
171. Tushnet, supra note 98, at 1639.
172. GRODZINS, supra note 34, at 5-24 (including foreign affairs as an example, and also noting
that while the Constitution bars certain federal officials from simultaneously holding office in other
branches of the federal government, no such constitutional bar operates to preclude dual office holding
between state and federal governments). Note that Scheiber disagrees, arguing that Grodzins' claim is
"spurious and insupportable" but that, given the era in which the claim was advanced (during President
Johnson's term), the appeal of the historical continuity of Johnson's "partnership" themes with earlier
eras lent persuasive power to Grodzins' theory. See Scheiber, supra note 7, at 265-90.
173. Mashaw makes a similar point in the context of the debate about categorical entitlements and
block grants. See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 4, at 298-99.
174. Frankfurter & Landis, Compact Clause, supra note 32, at 729 (in context of responding to
"shibboleths 'States-Rights' and 'National Supremacy'").
175. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 37, at 908-09.
176. Daniel J. Meador, Transformation oftheAmerican Judiciary, 46 ALA. L. REV. 763, 777-82
(1995) (considering advantages of unified state and federal court system and trends that underlie
movement in that direction).
177. Kramer, supra note 36, at 1504 ("by comparison with other developed nations, it's striking
how much authority in this country is still exercised by state law"); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 39, at 1358-59 (arguing that federalism has problem "of credibility" if it does not seek to maintain
"robust" role for state governance).
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means by which to do so.178 These divergent images capture different
moments of political promise and despair, at times focused on the immense
power of the national project, and other times appreciating the vitality and
durability of forms of governance that, without guns or great resources,
continue to have social and political force.
Much of the identity of either a state or a federal government is gained
from distinguishing itself from the "other." The dichotomy may serve therefore
in rhetorical political debates, but it misses the many "others," the variety of
combinations, be they intermediate organizations, regionalism within states,
networks of states, or informal as well as rule-based collaborations. Again
using the context of the federal courts, the narrative of the twentieth century
federal judicial system that I prefer to tell is one of invention, some quiet and
some exuberant, some elegant and some jury-rigged. Take magistrate judges,
who accrued power slowly over a period of thirty years, not even gaining the
title "judge" until 1990.179 The emergence of the fourth tier of federal judges
(magistrate and bankruptcy judges) need not be relegated to an embarrassed
footnote but rather seen as an innovative mechanism almost to double the size
of the federal trial bench during decades when a variety of political obstacles
made infeasible the expansion of the life-tenured apparatus. Consider also the
growth of agency adjudication, with its trumpeted beginnings (the New Dealers
praised this cadre of what today we call bureaucrats and hoped that their
regulatory efforts would benefit the country), its more quiet expansion during
the 1950s and 1960s, its siege of criticism resulting in the "due process
revolution," during which procedural obligations were imposed on agency
adjudication and by which agencies came all the more to resemble courts. 180
The more recent developments, of judicial federalism, large-scale litigation,
and fluid borders, could in turn prompt yet another round of innovations,
aspiring to create additional judicial services with stature and wealth. Whether
it might be "national courts" to deal with the many instances in contemporary
litigation that involve disputes not fairly described as either federal or
state,181 or something else, interstate problems need not necessarily be
understood as federal problems nor remitted to a single state." Collabora-
178. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 106, at 1045-52; 1064-68 (overlapping jurisdiction also useful
to enact tensions in governance and ambivalence about norms); Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy, supra note 106.
179. See Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117 (1990), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 631 note (1994) (change of name of United
States magistrate to "United States Magistrate Judge").
180. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring hearing prior to termination of welfare
benefits).
181. In addition to the aggregate tort litigation, discussed above, ordinary diversity litigation and
certain crimes could also fall within such a court's jurisdiction.
182. In many respects, the suggestion of an interstate court reflects calls from earlier eras on the
need for interstate regulatory coordination. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, Compact Clause, supra note
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tive, noncategorical federalism captures some of the emerging methods of legal
practice that cut across state and federal jurisdiction. Just as states exist in part
by constitutional inscription but also because of the habit of invoking them as
relevant sources of governance,"r so might we build on practices of co-
venturing across states to enable additional effective means of providing new
opportunities for multiple voices, exchange, and coordination. 18,
To do so, law, empirical inquiries, and theorizing about both will have to
shift." For example, doctrines that privilege activities of states above those
of regions would need to be reconsidered,"8 6 as will the question of how to
32, at 717 (explaining state compacts relating to natural resources: "The regional characteristic of
electric power, as a social and engineering fact, must find a counterpart in the effort of law to deal with
it. No single State in isolation can wholly deal with the problem.... Co-ordinated regulation among
groups of States, in harmony with the Federal administration, ... must be the objective"). These
comments are also related to what David Shapiro calls "intermediate federalism," which he describes
as responding to the functional utility of regional responses and in which the federal role is that of
"facilitator." DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 135-37 (1995). The difference between
the Frankfurter & Landis conception and current ones is in part also an artifact of technology. For them,
regionalization was central. Today, groups of states (such as California and states on the East Coast)
combine for certain purposes, not necessarily prompted by geographical proximity.
183. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEu, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 105-36 (John B.
Thompson ed. & Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991); see also Briffault, supra note 59,
at 1346-47 (discussing how "complex of values.., gives the states a certain importance in the popular
consciousness that reinforce their political position").
184. Such interaction would be responsive to Susan Rose-Ackerman's point, that even within a
given area such as environmental regulation, some issues are better dealt with at differing levels of
governance and the choice should not be cast as either local or national regulation. See Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 110.
185. As Frankfurter and Landis put it: "The challenge of the situation is to make legal
accommodations of these practical impingements." See Frankfurter & Landis, Compact Clause, supra
note 32, at 687 (the referent was to then-spreading phenomenon of federalism and the existence of two
"lawmaking agencies, State and Nation").
186. Not only do the terms of Lopez, Seminole Tribe of Florida, and New York need to be revisited,
(see, e.g., Gordon, supra note 7, at 222, but doctrines such as sovereign immunity need also be
addressed. I agree with Vicki Jackson that sovereign immunity should be understood as an abstention
doctrine. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1988). The question is whether, to the extent such deference should be
accorded, it should flow equally towards state-created compact entities and unitary states.
The current rule, developed before the expansion of the Eleventh Amendment in Seminole Indian
Tribe, is that because "[bistate entities occupy a significantly different position in our federal system
than do the States themselves ... [and] address 'interests and problems that do not coincide nicely
either with the national boundaries or with State lines,'" Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.
(PATH), 115 S. Ct. 394, 400 (1994), and are the product of Congress as well as the consenting states,
suit against them in federal court does not pose any incursion of state sovereign authority and "the
federal tribunal cannot be regarded as alien in this cooperative, trigovermmental arrangement." SeeHess,
115 S. Ct. at 401; Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990); Lake County
Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). My point here is not to argue for
expansion of the Eleventh Amendment but to ask about how, doctrinally, to provide stature for such
"trigovernmental arrangements" to reflect that their operation is as critical to the operation of the
country as is action located in a single state and that, like states, such compacts implicate governmental
concerns of "solvency and dignity." Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 406. Note that raising such concerns does not
necessarily result in insulation of compact entities from suits such as the injured-railroad worker's
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) claim at issue in Hess, an alternative is to reconceive of the
Eleventh Amendment as not insulating states from such litigation as well, developing different
conceptions of the role of federal courts, or creating alternativefora for the litigation of such cases.
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conceptualize individuals, as residents and citizens of single states, as members
of regions for certain purposes, or as members of more than one state.
187
With a focus on interstate mutual activities, a series of questions arise: do
interstate compacts provide sufficient mechanisms to insure accountability or
fiscal rationality? Do these compacts reflect and/or implement democratic
processes? 8' What effect do current legal doctrines-that every compact
sanctioned by Congress can be subject to federal court interpretation because
they present "federal questions"-have on the political power of states?"8 9
Those concerned about "races to the bottom" will need to interrogate their own
models of competition to consider how joint ventures and participants in
compacts fit, to decide which entities might be termed competitors; they will
need to include within their analytic search for optimal levels of regulation the
role of such compacts. Also at issue will be whether legal and political
interpretations of congressional oversight of such agreements serve as useful
monitoring systems or build in troublesome distortions."9 For those con-
cerned about social programs such as income subsidies, inquiries will need to
be framed about the mobility of lower income echelons and whether regional
responses are appropriate. The very idea of what is "close to citizens" 191 will
need to change. Further, how parts of the country relate to each other varies;
"[w]hat constitutes a 'section' at one time, then, may not constitute one at a
later time as a result of discoveries, developments, or change of some
187. Implicated, of course, are constitutionally-based voting rules.
188. See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 4, at 298-99, raising such concerns in the context of block
grants and categorical entitlement programs. Part of the question will have to be how these political units
work in comparison to other state, local, and national structures. See DOIG, supra note 46, at 4-12; 166-
250 (analyzing metropolitan transportation systems and regional politics in the New York, New Jersey
region in the 1950s and 1960s). Professor Barry Friedman, who commented at the symposium, also
raised concerns about accountability.
Similarly, the example I provided of large-scale aggregate litigation, in which state and federal
judges and litigants create ad hoc entities, have prompted concern about the degree to which they ensure
adequate representation of the interests determined. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Infected Hemophiliacs and
Tainted Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1996, at Cl (some "activist" litigant members of the class
argued that lawyers had not adequately represented them, negotiated directly with defendants, and then
some form of agreement was forged among lawyers and clients); Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up
JustDesserts, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 811 (1995) (many essays criticizing the agreements in such cases);
see also Resnik, Curtis, & Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate, supra note 71.
189. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 (1981).
190. Echoing, in late twentieth century terms what were concerns decades ago. See, e.g., THURSBY,
supra note 32, at 5-10 (discussing arguments, framed in the mid-1930s, about when regional compacts
would result in "sectionalism" and relaying commentary about how compacts are supposed to fulfill
interests that would not be well-served by either national or state based political action, with
congressional oversight to ensure that neither other regions nor the nation suffer from such agreements).
191. The European Community's term. See supra note 31. Both Marquardt and Guehenno share
a sense that the nation in Europe is a political unit that is (in Guehenno's words, supra note 64, at 12-
13) "too remote to manage the problems of our daily life" and "too constrained to confront the global
problems that affect us." Guehenno further argues that "classical federalism" is no solution, for it too
is tied to territorial arrangements now obsolete. Id. at 16.
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kind." 1 2 Similarly, what might be conceptualized as "threaten[ing] federal
supremacy" 19 will need to be reevaluated.
In short, discussants of federalism less pressed by politics will have to fight
the rhetorical pressures of national and states' rights in search of new
alternatives, and equally important, in quest of already extant options.
192. THURSBY, supra note 32, at 7 (using as example that Tennessee Valley Authority distributed
electricity beyond that valley).
193. A term within United States law. See United Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Conm'n, 434 U.S.
452, 473 (1978).

